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ABSTRACT 
Schizophrenia (SZ) is a chronic mental disorder characterized by longstanding 
and severe social functioning deficits. In trying to better understand psychosocial factors 
that perpetuate these functional deficits, this dissertation included three studies that 
examine cognitive and affective factors with the potential to improve functional 
outcomes in SZ: 1) emotional experience, 2) paranoia, and 3) reasoning. Study one 
examined negative/positive affect and social functioning with self-report measures 
among SZ, affective disorders, and the general population. Study 2 assessed paranoia 
and its relationship with the interpretation of the environment via affective sound 
localization in SZ. Study 3 compared probabilistic reasoning when estimating the likely 
source of threatening and non-threatening affective stimuli while also examining the 
relationship between probabilistic reasoning and delusional thinking in SZ. The findings 
of this dissertation suggest that for people with schizophrenia: 1) treatment of 
heightened negative affect and reduced positive affect may improve social functioning, 
2) paranoia may aid localization of natural sounds that occur in the environment, and 3) 
promoting more conservative probabilistic reasoning may help to reduce delusional 
thinking.
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
Overview 
Psychosis is a disconnection from reality that can manifest as paranoid and 
delusional thinking. This type of thinking occurs when people firmly hold false beliefs. 
Delusional thinking appears in varying severity, ranging from one of the most debilitating 
diseases in the world, schizophrenia (WHO, 2004), to 10-15% of the general population 
who experience regular delusions and minimal functional impairment (Freeman et al., 
2007). In line with the transdiagnostic framework of the NIMH Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) Initiative, this pattern suggests that delusional thinking may exist along a 
dimension and is not specific to a serious mental illness. 
Delusional thinking is associated with excess dopamine transmission in the 
reward system regions of the brain. Dopamine plays a significant role in the prediction 
of novel rewards and identification of salient stimuli. Abnormal dopamine transmission 
alters these processes and leads to an aberrant sense of novelty and inappropriate 
assignment of salience to insignificant events that can result in the formation of false 
paranoid beliefs (e.g., a stranger briefly staring at you may be misinterpreted as a 
threat; Morrison & Murray, 2009). 
As such, treatment for psychosis has traditionally consisted of dopamine 
antagonists called antipsychotic medications, which target delusional thinking via 
blockage of excess dopamine receptors in the brain (Kapur, Agid, Mizrahi, & Li, 2006). 
While antipsychotic medications can be effective in managing delusions, up to 30% of 
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people with a psychosis do not respond to these medications (Ackenheil & Weber, 
2004). Further, the metabolic side effects of antipsychotic medications may contribute to 
high rates of non-compliance (Dibonaventura, Gabriel, Dupclay, Gupta, & Kim, 2012), 
as individuals experience weight gain and increased risk for cardiovascular disease 
(Tschoner et al., 2007). While social functioning may improve with continued use of 
antipsychotic medications, most individuals do not return to premorbid levels of 
functioning with these medications alone (Chien & Yip, 2013). In response to concerns 
of antipsychotic side effects, compliance, and effectiveness, cognitive-behavioral 
therapy for psychosis (CBTp) has emerged as an empirically supported treatment for 
psychotic symptoms (e.g., delusional thinking) across diagnostic groups (e.g., 
delusional thinking, Mehl, Werner, & Lincoln, 2015). Evidence suggests that treatment 
with CBTp may help regulate dopamine transmission in the brain similar to 
antipsychotics (Bell et al., 2008; Cervenka et al., 2012). CBTp is based on Beck’s 
cognitive model of psychopathology in which biased processing of events/stimuli 
promotes a distorted interpretation of these experiences and leads to maladaptive 
emotional and behavioral responses (Beck, 1963, 2005). In psychosis, the combination 
of biased thinking, negative emotions, and maladaptive behaviors may interact to 
perpetuate delusional thinking (Mueser, Deavers, Penn, & Cassisi, 2013). For example, 
the sound of a neighbor walking through one’s yard late at night may be interpreted as a 
salient event and hastily misinterpreted as a suspicious act. A delusional thought that 
this neighbor is a spy may arise due to overestimation of the current limited evidence 
(i.e., neighbor is walking through the yard). This perceived threat might lead to the 
evocation of negative affect that helps to reinforce the belief (e.g., “I feel fear and 
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anxiety so this person is a threat”) and behavioral changes such as avoiding neighbors. 
Repeated avoidance results in missed opportunities to challenge this hasty conclusion 
and can lead to an intractable delusional and paranoid thought (e.g., my neighbor is a 
spy). Within the CBTp model, a cycle of paranoia, biased thinking and reasoning (e.g., 
overestimation of improbable events), misinterpretation of environmental/social stimuli, 
and negative emotions may help to explain the chronic social functioning deficits 
observed in serious mental illnesses. In particular, mundane social interactions may be 
negatively misinterpreted and considered stressful events (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003) 
that elicit heightened negative affect, along with biased and delusional/paranoid thinking 
and incautious reasoning (Sarin & Wallin, 2014).  
Within this cognitive model, the contribution of emotional experience towards 
delusional thinking and social functioning is particularly striking considering the high 
prevalence and frequency of negative emotions and lack of positive emotions reported 
in people with psychosis compared with healthy controls (Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, 
Smith, & Harvey, 2011; Horan, Blanchard, Clark, & Green, 2008; Kring & Moran, 2008; 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & deVries, 2000; Oorschot et al., 2013; Rowland et al., 2013; 
Tso, Grove, & Taylor, 2014). Negative and positive affect are related to both clinical 
outcomes (e.g., delusional thinking), functional outcomes (Dinzeo, Cohen, Nienow, & 
Docherty, 2008; Docherty et al., 2011; McCleery et al., 2012), and the interpretation of 
neutral stimuli as threatening in people with psychosis (Underwood, Kumari, & Peters, 
2016). Thus, emotional experience is associated with biased interpretations of the 
environment (i.e., misinterpretation of threat) and appears to play a role in functional 
outcomes within psychosis (van Rossum, Dominguez, Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os, 2011). 
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As such, one of the aims of CBTp is to challenge biased thinking and reasoning 
prior to the experience of elevated negative affect and formation of delusions. By 
challenging biases (e.g., collecting evidence for and against a conclusion; utilizing 
cautious reasoning), CBTp may help to reduce the heightened neural and negative 
emotional response to threatening stimuli (Kumari et al., 2011; Mason, Peters, Dima, 
Williams, & Kumari, 2016). Yet, despite this evidence for CBTp effectiveness (Kane et 
al., 2016), meta-analyses show small effect sizes for CBTp in people with psychosis (g 
= -0.33) when comparing overall symptoms before and after treatment (Jauhar et al., 
2014). It is possible that the cognitive model of CBTp may be enhanced with a greater 
ecological understanding of paranoid thinking and biased reasoning, along with 
emotional experience, within serious mental illnesses. Further exploration of emotions 
and biases within social and affective contexts may help to enhance our understanding 
of critical CBTp treatment targets. For instance, while people with schizophrenia have 
shown deficits in the ability to accurately interpret the environment via impaired sound 
localization accuracy (Balogh, 1979; Perrin, 2010), it is currently unknown if sound 
localization deficits vary by the affect elicited by sounds that may be heard within the 
natural environment (e.g., someone laughing). In addition, it is unknown if paranoia is 
associated with the ability to interpret the environment via sound localization in people 
with schizophrenia. Finally, few studies have determined if probabilistic reasoning varies 
between neutral and affective contexts. Moreover, a transdiagnostic approach may yield 
a broader understanding of emotional experience, as a relationship between social 
functioning impairment and heightened negative affect and reduced positive affect 
across diagnoses would suggest a unified treatment protocol for affect.   
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The present dissertation includes three studies that examines emotional 
experience and social functioning, paranoid thinking and the interpretation of the 
environment, and probabilistic reasoning of affective stimuli in people with a serious 
mental illness.  
The first study seeks to determine if negative affect is associated with social 
functioning across groups, ranging from healthy individuals to mood disorders and 
psychotic disorders. An integrated data analysis was used that incorporates self-report 
measures of negative affect and social functioning from five studies at the University of 
Michigan, one online study, and one multi-site study that includes Harvard University, 
Columbia University, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, and the 
University of Michigan. Within clinical populations, we examined the incremental 
contribution of negative affect towards social functioning with respect to traditional 
predictors that include positive/negative symptoms, non-social cognition, and social 
cognition. 
The second study examined the relationship between paranoia and the 
emotional reaction to- and spatial localization of- environmental stimuli. A sound 
localization paradigm was used in people with schizophrenia and healthy individuals. 
Participants provided valence/arousal ratings for each environmental sound in addition 
to localizing these sounds. Sound localization performance was compared by individual 
and standardized valence/arousal ratings of stimuli. Levels of paranoia and 
neurocognition were assessed. 
The third study explores probabilistic reasoning that may contribute to a specific 
cognitive bias robustly associated with delusional thinking in people with psychosis (i.e., 
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jumping to conclusions). This study used two versions of a probabilistic reasoning task, 
with one version using only neutral stimuli and the other using affective stimuli (i.e., 
threatening and non-threatening). Differences in probabilistic reasoning will be 
compared by evidence type (i.e., disconfirmatory or confirmatory), salience of stimuli 
(threatening or non-threatening), and by group (i.e. schizophrenia or healthy control). 
The relationship between probabilistic reasoning and delusional thinking was examined. 
The results of this dissertation may help to guide future research aimed at 
enhancing the effectiveness of CBTp interventions for people with a serious mental 
illness.  
Specific Aims 
 
1. Determine if emotional experience (i.e., negative and positive affect) is 
associated with social functioning across serious mental illnesses and non-
clinical populations. 
2. Determine the relationship between paranoia and the affective reaction to- and 
localization of- auditory environmental stimuli in people with schizophrenia. 
3. Examine probabilistic reasoning style during an affective paradigm using 
threatening and non-threatening stimuli in people with schizophrenia.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Study 1. Emotional experience and social functioning in psychotic disorders, 
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and non-clinical groups 
 
Abstract 
Evidence suggests that emotional experience contributes to functional outcomes 
in severe mental illnesses. Yet, it is unknown if the strength of this relationship differs 
within mental illnesses compared with the general population. This cross-sectional study 
expands upon previous work by examining emotional experience (i.e., negative and 
positive affect) as a predictor of social functioning in a large sample of clinical and non-
clinical groups. A total of 1,118 participants from six clinical studies at the University of 
Michigan and a national multi-site study diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, bipolar 
disorder, or major depressive disorder, along with healthy controls and a crowdsourcing 
sample, completed self-report measures of negative affect (e.g., State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory and Beck Depression Inventory) and positive affect (e.g., Differential 
Emotions Scale). These measures predicted social functioning with medium to large 
effect sizes (r = 0.35 to 0.80 for negative affect; r = -0.28 to -0.59 for positive affect)  
even after controlling for “traditional” predictors of outcomes that include demographics, 
cognition or intelligence, positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and/or mania within 
each group. Accordingly, the results suggest that emotional experience is a critical 
dimension of functioning across mental illnesses and the general population. 
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Introduction 
Severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major 
depressive disorder are characterized by chronic deficits in social functioning. Research 
suggests that emotional experience in the form of heightened negative affect (e.g., 
sadness and anxiety) and decreased positive affect (e.g., calmness and confidence) 
may contribute to these social functioning deficits. A relationship between affect and 
functioning could exist across disorders, including schizophrenia, as people with 
schizophrenia report heightened negative affect and decreased positive affect 
(Havermans, Nicolson, Berkhof, & deVries, 2010; Hofmann & Meyer, 2006; Kring & 
Moran, 2008; Oorschot et al., 2013) that is related to social functioning (Kohler & Martin, 
2006). Despite this potential relationship, emotional experience has traditionally been 
overlooked in schizophrenia (Kring & Caponigro, 2010).  
In light of the National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria 
Initiative (RDoC; Insel et al., 2010) in which dimensions of functioning (e.g., cognition 
and behavior) are examined across traditional categories of mental disorders and those 
without psychopathology, emotional experience could be considered such a dimension 
across both clinical and general populations, with heightened negative affect and 
reduced positive affect in psychopathology that warrants treatment. Elevated negative 
affect and reduced positive affect may contribute to social functioning deficits in 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder above and beyond cognitive deficits, positive 
symptoms, or negative symptoms (Grove et al., 2016; Tso, Grove, & Taylor, 2010). 
However, it is currently unknown if this pattern is distinctly different or stronger within 
groups of psychopathologies compared with the general population. It is possible that 
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the contribution of emotional experience towards social functioning is specific to 
categories of mental illnesses and/or is a dimension of functioning relevant to the 
general population and those without psychopathology. Further, it is unknown if the 
functional role of both negative and positive affect is independent of “traditional” 
predictors of outcome (e.g., neurocognition) across this wide range of populations. 
Thus, the primary goals of the current study are to: (1) examine levels of negative 
and positive affect in a range of clinical and non-clinical samples using self-report 
measures, (2) identify potential differences in levels of negative and positive affect as a 
function of clinical diagnosis, and (3) determine if levels of negative and positive affect 
explain a significant amount of variance in social functioning among all participants and 
within each diagnostic group before and after accounting for traditional functional 
predictors, including neurocognition or general intelligence, social cognition, positive 
symptoms (e.g., hallucinations), negative symptoms (e.g., anhedonia), mania, and/or 
demographics. We predicted that elevated negative affect and reduced positive affect 
would be present in all clinical samples (i.e., major depressive disorder [MDD], bipolar 
disorder [BD], and schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders [SOPD]) compared with 
healthy controls (HC) and the general population (i.e., online crowdsourcing sample via 
Amazon mechanical Turk [M-Turk]). We also predicted that, within each sample, a 
significant amount of variance in social functioning would be explained by each 
measure of negative and positive affect, even after accounting for traditional functional 
predictors. Ultimately, the findings may provide justification for unified psychosocial 
interventions (Bullis et al., 2015) that aim to reduce negative affect and promote positive 
affect in order to improve social functioning in severe mental illnesses. 
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Methods 
Participants 
We aggregated cross-sectional data collected from: 1) six separate University of 
Michigan studies in the Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry and College of 
Pharmacy, 2) a four-site study Establishing Moderators and Biosignatures of 
Antidepressant Response for Clinical Care (EMBARC; Trivedi et al., 2016) that included 
the University of Michigan, Columbia University, McLean Hospital/Massachusetts 
General Hospital/Harvard Medical School, and the University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center, and 3) the Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) online crowdsourcing 
platform, which provided a diverse sample more representative of the general 
population than traditional convenience samples such as undergraduate subject pools, 
along with comparable reliability (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Taken together, the study included 1,118 
participants, with 718 participants having a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) Axis I diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, 
bipolar disorder I, bipolar disorder II, bipolar disorder not otherwise specified, or major 
depressive disorder as verified by the patient version of the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997) or the Diagnostic 
Interview for Genetic Studies (DIGS; Nurnberger et al., 1994). In addition, 142 
participants had no history of a DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis verified by the non-patient 
version of the SCID-IV (First et al., 1997). A total of 257 participants completed 
measures online via M-Turk and provided self-report diagnosis of a mental illness but 
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did not complete assessments of cognition or symptoms. A total of 329 participants 
(healthy control = 84; psychotic disorder not otherwise specified = 21; schizoaffective = 
105; and schizophrenia = 119) were part of a previous report that also focused on 
negative affect and social functioning (Grove et al., 2016). Since participants did not 
complete the same measures across studies, participants were organized into groups 
based on diagnosis or sample origin to include the maximal number of participants 
based on available data (i.e., healthy controls [HC], M-Turk participants [M-Turk], major 
depressive disorder [MDD], bipolar disorders [BD], and schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders [SOPD]). See Table 1 for measures available, sample size, and 
diagnoses per group.   
Self-report measures 
 Negative affect 
Six self-report measures were used to assess levels of negative affect: 1) State 
subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), 2) Revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-IA; 
Beck & Steer, 1987), 3) Negative emotions subscale of the modified version of the 
Differential Emotions Scale (DES-N; Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003), 4) 
Psychological Stress Index (PSI; Tso, Grove, & Taylor, 2012), 5) Negative affect 
subscale of the state version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-N; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and/or 6) General Distress Subscale of the 30-item 
version of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-GD; Nitschke, Heller, 
Imig, McDonald, & Miller, 2001; Wardenaar et al., 2010). 
Positive affect 
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Three self-report measures were used to assess levels of positive affect: 1) 
Positive emotion subscale of the modified version of the Differential Emotions Scale 
(DES-P; Fredrickson et al., 2003), 2) Positive affect subscale of the state version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-P; Watson et al., 1988), and/or 3) 
Anhedonic Depression Subscale of the 30-item version of the Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire, which measures a lack of positive affect and thus was reverse 
scored (MASQ-AD; Nitschke et al., 2001).  
 Social functioning 
The Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report (SAS-SR; Weissman, 1999) was 
used to assess social functioning. SAS-SR includes six domains of functioning: 1) work 
role, 2) social and leisure, 3) family outside the home, 4) primary relationship, 5) 
parental, and 6) family unit. SAS-SR has demonstrated a strong relationship with the 
clinician-rated Global Assessment of Functioning scale in SZ (Wittorf, Wiedemann, 
Buchkremer, & Klingberg, 2008) and has been used in BD (Sentissi et al., 2008) and 
MDD (Dunn et al., 2012). Only participants enrolled in EMBARC completed the 
abbreviated 24-item version of the SAS-SR (Gameroff, Wickramaratne, & Weissman, 
2012). Higher scores indicate poorer social functioning.   
Other self-report  
The Altman Self-Rating of Mania (ASRM; Altman, Hedeker, Peterson, & Davis, 
1997) was used to assess mania. 
Clinical ratings and Medications 
Positive symptoms of psychosis were assessed with the Scale for the 
Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984b). Negative symptoms of 
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psychosis were assessed with the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms 
(SANS; Andreasen, 1984a). Daily chlorpromazine (CPZ) equivalents in milligrams were 
determined for participants taking antipsychotic medications (Woods, 2003, 2011) are 
available in Supplemental Table 1, along with use of antidepressants, anxiolytics, and 
mood stabilizers. 
Neuropsychological assessments 
The Brief Assessment of Cognition (BACS; Keefe et al., 2004) or Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was used to assess general 
neurocognitive function or intelligence, respectively, according to the individual study 
protocols. The Managing Emotions branch of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT-ME; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 1999) was used to assess 
social cognition. 
Data analyses 
To reduce the number of analyses, z-scores of negative and positive affect 
measures for each participant were computed and then averaged for each group’s 
unique combination of available measures (e.g., negative affect composite z-score for 
M-Turk participants consisted of the average of BDI-IA, STAI-S, DES-N, and PANAS-N 
z-scores). Composite negative and positive affect z-score, along with each 
negative/positive self-report measure, clinical measures, and demographics, were 
compared between groups via one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Tukey HSD was 
used for all post-hoc ANOVA analyses. Table 2 provides all demographic and clinical 
differences between groups. Chi-square was used to assess differences in 
demographics and psychotropic medication use between groups. A simple t-test was 
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used to determine differences in daily CPZ equivalents between BD and SOPD 
(Supplemental Table 1). Internal consistency of self-report measures was determined 
with Cronbach’s alpha. Self-report measures demonstrated good to excellent internal 
consistency (α = 0.82 to 0.95) among all participants, including M-Turk participants. 
Pearson correlation analysis was used to determine relationships between social 
functioning (SAS-SR), “traditional” functional predictors (i.e., neurocognition or general 
intelligence, social cognition, positive symptoms, negative symptoms, manic symptoms, 
and/or age, sex, and level of education), individual measures of negative/positive affect, 
and daily CPZ equivalents in milligrams. Pearson correlation analysis was also used to 
determine the relationship between social functioning and composite negative/positive 
affect z-score in each group. Fisher r-to-z transformation was used to determine group 
differences between these Pearson correlations. 
Simple regression models were used to examine the relationship between SAS-
SR and negative/positive composite z-score, along with each individual measure of 
negative/positive affect, in each group. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to 
predict SAS-SR variance with composite negative/positive affect z-score above and 
beyond traditional predictors of functioning within each group. Using a separate multiple 
regression analysis with demographic variables predicting SAS-SR among all 
participants, only significant demographic predictors of SAS-SR, along with other 
traditional predictors, were entered into Step 1 of the hierarchical regression analyses 
for each group. The composite negative or positive affect z-score was placed into Step 
2 of all the group regression models, resulting in two regression models for each group. 
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These hierarchical regression analyses were also repeated with each individual 
measure of negative/positive affect within in each group.     
Results 
Significant correlations were observed between SAS-SR and all measures of 
affect (Figure 1). All self-report measures of negative and positive affect were 
significantly correlated with one another among all participants (Supplemental Table 2). 
Figure 2 shows that the correlation between SAS-SR and composite negative or 
positive affect was significant in all groups. For negative affect composite, when 
conducting pairwise comparisons between these correlations using Fisher r-to-z 
transformation, HC and MDD shared the weakest correlation and BD had the strongest 
correlation. M-Turk and SOPD were intermediate to these groups. For positive affect 
composite, MDD had the weakest correlation compared with all other groups.  
Hierarchical regression analyses showed that composite negative/positive affect 
z-score each predicted SAS-SR variance after controlling for available “traditional” 
variables in HC, MDD, BD, and SOPD (Table 3). These findings were replicated using 
each raw individual measure of negative/positive affect (Supplemental Table 3). The 
significant demographic differences observed between the groups (Table 2), provided 
justification for a separate multiple regression analysis (i.e., age, sex, and level of 
education predicting SAS-SR among all participants) to determine which demographic 
variables to include in Step 1 of the hierarchical regression analyses. Level of education 
and sex but not age significantly predicted composite negative affect variance, p’s < 
0.01. Level of education but not age or sex significantly predicted composite positive 
affect variance, p < 0.001. Thus, only level of education was entered into Step 1 of the 
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hierarchical regression analyses (sex was also included for negative affect only). Simple 
regression models showed that composite negative/positive affect z-score, along with 
each individual negative/positive affect measure, significantly predicted SAS-SR 
variance (Supplemental Table 4).   
One-way ANOVA and Tukey HSD post-analysis showed that composite levels of 
negative affect were significantly elevated in MDD, BD, and SOPD compared with HC. 
M-Turk participants were intermediate to HC and clinical groups. Composite levels of 
positive affect were significantly reduced in MDD, BD, and SOPD compared with HC. 
M-Turk participants were again intermediate to HC and clinical groups (Figure 3). 
Discussion 
The current study examined the relationship between self-reported negative and 
positive affect and social functioning in people diagnosed with a major depressive 
disorder, bipolar disorder, psychotic disorder, along with an unselected online 
crowdsourcing sample to represent the general population and people with no history of 
a mental illness (N = 1,118). While the highest levels of negative affect and lowest 
levels of positive affect were observed in those diagnosed with a mental illness, both 
negative and positive affect explained significant amounts of variance in social 
functioning across all groups (up to 50%). Levels of negative and positive affect also 
explained a significant amount of social functioning variance above and beyond the 
available “traditional” predictors of functioning that include neurocognition or general 
intelligence, social cognition, positive symptoms, negative symptoms, mania, and/or 
demographics. Thus, affect appears to be a significant predictor of self-reported social 
functioning across the continuum between psychopathology and heath. 
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The current findings show comparable emotional experience of negative and 
positive affect between MDD, BD, and SOPD, along with a strong link between affect 
and social functioning. Heightened negative affect and reduced positive affect have 
been identified as critical components in the pharmacological and/or psychosocial 
treatment of MDD (Michels, 1997; Oren-Yagoda, Bjorgvinsson, & Aderka, 2017), with a 
lack of positive emotions being a discriminative characteristic of MDD compared with 
anxiety disorders (Eysenck & Fajkowska, 2017). For SOPD and BD, treatment of 
heightened negative affect or reduced positive affect (e.g., depression) may be focused 
on pharmacology (Parker, Graham, & Tavella, 2017) and most people with a severe 
mental illness do not receive psychosocial treatments (Ince, Haddock, & Tai, 2016; 
Lehman & Steinwachs, 1998; Moran, 2003). As an adjunct to pharmacology, unified 
psychosocial treatment protocols (Taylor, Lyubomirsky, & Stein, 2017) for reducing 
negative affect and increasing positive affect across affective and psychotic disorders 
may help to improve social functioning.  
Heightened negative affect and reduced positive affect in mental illnesses 
compared with non-clinical samples may be explained by heightened stress 
sensitivity—a reduced ability to tolerate minor stressors that often results in the 
experience of negative emotions (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). Stress sensitivity has 
been linked to the pathophysiology and risk of MDD (Bogdan, Nikolova, & Pizzagalli, 
2013; Wichers et al., 2009), BD (Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, Keyser, & Gerstein, 2006), 
and schizophrenia (Corcoran et al., 2012). Stress sensitivity in these disorders may be 
linked to dysregulation of the physiological response (e.g., heightened cortisol levels) to 
stress via the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Steen et al., 2014; Steen et al., 
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2011; Zimmerman, Bellaire, Ewing, & Grace, 2013). Yet, the causal relationship 
between HPA axis dysregulation and negative affect is unknown and complicated by 
findings of blunted cortisol in schizophrenia during a task that putatively elicits negative 
affect (i.e., Trier Social Stress Test (Zorn et al., 2017). A similar question arises with 
negative affect and social functioning in terms of causality (i.e., it is unknown if negative 
affect causes social functioning impairment or the reverse). While emotional experience 
is a predictor of social functioning in schizophrenia (Tso et al., 2010), if a cycle of 
negative affect (possibly associated with stress sensitivity and HPA axis abnormalities) 
and social functioning impairment exists, targeting emotional experience could help to 
weaken this cycle regardless of an established causal relationship between affect and 
social functioning. In contrast, those without a mental illness or subthreshold psychiatric 
symptoms may demonstrate resiliency towards minor stressors. Unified psychosocial 
treatment protocols could help patients build sustainable coping skills to manage 
distressing symptoms and events that may lead to negative affect (Smith, Nathan, 
Juniper, Kingstep, & Lim, 2003) and promote behavioral activation (Mazzucchelli, Kane, 
& Rees, 2010) to increase positive affect. However, before such protocols are 
developed, future investigations of the psychosocial mechanisms of negative affect 
across normal functioning and psychopathology are needed prior to confirm appropriate 
treatment targets (e.g., stress sensitivity). 
The strong correlations observed between measures of depression, anxiety, 
psychological stress, general distress, anhedonic depression, and frequency of negative 
and positive emotions suggests that these measures may tap into a single latent factor 
known as emotional experience (i.e., negative and positive affect). Previous reports 
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have also shown strong correlations between measures of depression (BDI) and anxiety 
(STAI; Block, 1991; Nitschke et al., 2001) along with derivation of a latent variable of 
negative affect using the BDI and Beck Anxiety Inventory in clinical populations (Clark, 
Steer, & Beck, 1994). A comprehensive package of negative and positive affect 
measures used across a large sample of clinical and non-clinical participants would 
allow for the confirmation of this latent variable via factor analysis, as partially 
overlapping samples made factor analysis inappropriate due to the small ratio of sample 
size to variables in the current study.  
The relationship between social functioning and available measures of negative 
affect (STAI-S and MASQ) or positive affect (MASQ) was weakest in MDD compared 
with BD and SOPD, despite MDD reporting higher levels of depression, state anxiety, 
and social functioning impairment than BD and SOPD. It is possible that MDD is more 
heterogeneous than BD and SOPD in terms of personality profiles that carry unique 
levels of functional impairment (Hori et al., 2017). Thus, the relationship between affect 
and social functioning may be weaker in MDD. For this reason, treatment of MDD may 
be most effective when individually targeting both depressive symptoms and functional 
impairments (Sheehan, Nakagome, Asami, Pappadopulos, & Boucher, 2017). It is 
possible that stratification of MDD according to personality profiles would yield 
subgroups with a stronger relationship between affect and social functioning. However, 
the use of the abbreviated version of the SAS-SR in MDD only, along with the relatively 
limited number of affect measures in MDD, may have limited the examination of this 
relationship in the current study.  
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The M-Turk sample reported higher levels of negative affect and social 
functioning impairment than HC and were intermediate to those with a severe mental 
illness and HC. This finding suggests that M-Turk participants may not be “normal” or 
representative of the psychiatrically healthy population. Considering the growing use of 
M-Turk for non-clinical research (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Pauszek, Sztybel, & 
Gibson, 2017), emotional experience and social functioning may need to be considered 
when interpreting findings of such research. Nevertheless, the addition of the M-Turk 
sample falls in the subclinical range of the psychopathology-healthy continuum and is 
typically a more representative sample of the general population than traditional 
convenience samples such as undergraduate subject pools (e.g., older; more ethnically 
diverse and more life experiences; Behrend et al., 2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011). 
Limitations of the current study include the use of self-report measures, as 
memory function (Kuswanto, Sum, & Sim, 2013) and cognitive biases (Strauss & Gold, 
2012) influence the accuracy of self-reports. Since the time interval for the self-report 
measures used in this study ranged from the current moment (STAI-S) to the past 
month (PSI), measures with a reduced reliance on memory may be better suited to 
assess negative affect. However, similar self-report measures of social functioning and 
negative affect have demonstrated adequate internal consistency and/or test-retest 
reliability in studies of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Baumstarck et al., 2013; 
Leidy, Palmer, Murray, Robb, & Revicki, 1998; Ma et al., 2014; Trivedi et al., 2004), and 
are highly correlated with clinician estimates, which have the advantage of utilizing both 
patient report and behavioral observations (Voruganti, Heslegrave, Awad, & Seeman, 
1998). Self-report measures also demonstrate predictive validity, as self-reported 
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negative affect predicts objective outcome measures such as the number of 12-month 
interval hospitalizations in schizophrenia (Tso et al., 2012). Thus, self-reports provide 
critical, reliable, and valid assessment of negative affect and social functioning (Bellack 
et al., 2007). Future studies would benefit from independent assessments of social 
functioning in addition to a self-report measures to confirm concurrent validity. In 
addition, psychotropics (e.g., antidepressants) may reduce stress reactivity (Jacobson, 
2014), and in turn reduce negative affect. Thus, levels of negative affect in the current 
study may have been higher in the absence of psychotropics. However, the 
idiosyncratic patient response to medications (not just antidepressants) is difficult to 
control for practically and theoretically, making it difficult to draw conclusions regarding 
medications, affect, and social functioning. Further, the cross-sectional nature of the 
current study limits the determination of casual relationships. The use of an online 
crowdsourcing platform limited the ability to clinically assess M-Turk participants and 
might have the problem of selection bias, limiting the generalizability of the findings from 
this part of the sample in the current study.  
To conclude, negative and positive affect were highly predictive of social 
functioning independent of neurocognition or general intelligence, social cognition, 
positive symptoms, negative symptoms, mania, and/or demographics in people with a 
major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder, 
an unselected online crowdsourcing sample, and people with no history of mental 
illness. The findings suggest that emotional experience is a critical dimension relevant 
to social functioning regardless of diagnosis or presence of mental illness. Thus, 
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targeting emotional experience with empirically-supported interventions may improve 
social functioning in clinical populations.   
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Table 2.1: Summary of diagnoses and measures within each group (N=1,118) 
  HC  
(n=142) 
 M-Turk  
(n=257) 
 MDD  
(n=279) 
 BD  
(n=195) 
 SOPD 
 (n=245) 
(a) Diagnosis           
Psychotic disorders           
          Schizophrenia    3 (1%)      119 (49%) 
          Schizoaffective disorder          105 (43%) 
          Psychotic disorder NOS          21 (9%) 
Bipolar disorders    3 (1%)       
          Bipolar I disorder        148 (76%)   
          Bipolar II disorder        30 (15%)   
          Bipolar disorder NOS        1 (0%)   
Depression    28 (11%)       
          Major depressive disorder, single episode      36 (13%)     
          Major depressive disorder, recurrent      237 (85%)     
Anxiety    23 (9%)       
PTSD, Personality disorder, or other    7 (3%)       
No psychiatric diagnosis  142 (100%)  191 (74%)       
No diagnosis specifier provided    2 (1%)  6 (2%)  16 (8%)   
 
(b) Measures 
          
           
Neurocognition (BACS)  ×      ×  ü 
General intelligence (WASI)  ×    ü  ×   
Social cognition (MSCEIT-ME)  ×      ü  × 
Positive symptoms (SAPS)        ×  × 
Negative symptoms (SANS)        ×  × 
Mania (ASRM)        ü  × 
Positive affect           
          DES-P  ×  ü    ×  × 
          PANAS-P    ü    ×   
          MASQ-AD  ×    ü     
Negative affect           
     STAI-S  ü  ü  ü  ü  × 
     BDI-IA  ×  ü    ü  ü 
     DES-N  ×  ü    ü  × 
     PSI  ×      ü  ü 
     PANAS-N    ü    ×   
     MASQ-GD  ×    ü     
Social functioning (SAS-SR)  üa   ü  üa  ü  ü 
  35 
Note. Blank = not collected. × = not collected for all. ü = collected for all. * = diagnoses are self-reported. a = some or all participants completed 
the abbreviated version of the Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report (SAS-SR).  HC = healthy control. M-Turk = Amazon Mechanical Turk 
participants. MDD = Major depressive disorder. BD = Bipolar disorders. SOPD = Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. NOS = Not 
otherwise specified. PTSD = Post-traumatic stress disorder. BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. WASI = Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. MSCEIT-ME = Managing Emotions subscale of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. SAPS = 
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms.  ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania 
Scale.  DES-P = positive emotions subscale of the modified version of the Differential Emotions Scale. PANAS-P = The Positive Affect subscale of 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. MASQ-AD = Anhedonic Depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. STAI-
S = state subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Index. BDI-IA = revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory. DES-N = negative emotion 
subscale of the modified version of the Differential Emotions Scale.  PSI = Psychological Stress Index.  PANAS-N = The Negative Affect subscale 
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. MASQ-GD = General Distress subscale of the 30-item version of the Mood and Anxiety 
Questionnaire. SAS-SR = Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report.  
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Table 2.2: Demographic, cognitive, clinical, and functional characteristics of all participants (N = 1,118) 
   HC 
(n=142) 
 M-Turk  
(n=257) 
 MDD 
(n=279) 
 BD 
(n=195) 
  SOPD  
(n=245) 
 Omnibus Post-hoc 
 
Scale 
range 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  c2, F,  
or t 
p Tukey’s HSD or c2 
Age     39.2 (13.5)  36.3 (10.8)  36.9 (13.3)  46.7 (13.2)  43.7 (12.2)  28.93  <.0001 HC, M-Turk, MDD < BD, SOPD 
Sex (number of 
males) 
  75 (52.8%)  117 (46.1%)  93 (33.3%)  57 (29.7%)  139 (56.7%)  49.83 <.0001 M-Turk, BD < SOPD; MDD < HC, M-Turk, SZ; BD < HC, M-Turk  
Education 1-8  5.9 (1.6)  5.7 (0.9)  5.4 (1.8)  5.4 (1.7)  4.1 (1.6)  42.36 <.0001 MDD, BD < HC; SOPD < all 
1st language 
(English/Tamil/ 
other) 
    216 / 22 / 19           
Country of origin 
(USA/India/other) 
    193 / 57 / 7           
                
BACSa   0.0 (1.0)      -1.2 (1.0)  -2.1 (1.3)  90.39 <.0001 SOPD < BD < HC 
WASIa   113.7 (12.7)    112.5 (10.7)  108.9 (10.9)    5.63 .004 BD < HC, MDD  
MSCEIT-MEa   106.7 (19.9)      96.6 (12.0)  91.1 (15.5)  19.15 <.0001 SOPD < BD < HC 
                
SAPSa 0-5        0.6 (1.2)  4.4 (3.6)  3.93 .0002  
SANSa 0-5        4.1 (3.0)  6.5 (3.9)  3.52 .0006  
ASRMa 0-4  1.9 (2.6)      2.5 (3.2)  4.3 (4.0)  3.27 .04 BD < SOPD 
                
SAS-SRa 0-5  1.5 (0.3)  1.9 (0.6)  2.6 (0.6)  2.1 (0.6)  2.3 (0.5)  115.89 <.0001 HC < M-Turk < BD, SOPD < MDD 
Note.  aData not collected for all participants. For level of education, an ordinal ranking was created, with a higher level of education signified by a 
higher ranking. SES = socioeconomic status. BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence. MSCEIT-ME = Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = 
Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale. SAS-SR = Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report. M 
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= mean. SD = standard deviation. HC = healthy control. M-Turk = Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. MDD = major depressive disorder. BD = 
bipolar disorder. SOPD = schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. 
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Table 2.3: Hierarchical regression analyses of negative/positive affect composite scores as predictors of social functioning impairment (SAS-SR) 
variance after controlling for traditional functional predictors within each group 
   HC  M-Turk  MDD  BD  SOPD 
   (n=40)  (n=253)  (n=203)  (n=134)  V1 (n=189)  V2 (n=45) 
   Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model 
   b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2 
Step 1 (Model A)                   
 Level of education  -0.09* 0.05  -0.16* 0.03*  0.08 0.06**  -0.19* 0.27***  -0.03 0.04*  -0.10 0.16 
 Sex  -0.23   -0.03   0.12   0.18*   0.18*   0.17  
 BACS  0.02            -0.09   -0.30  
 WASI        -0.23**   -0.19*        
 MSCEIT-ME           -0.31***      0.28  
 SAPS                 0.08  
 SANS                 0.18  
 ASRM           0.12        
Step 2                   
 Negative affect 
composite 
 0.51** 0.20**  0.69*** 0.48***  0.33*** 0.11***  0.71*** 0.41***  0.70*** 0.46***  0.76*** 0.37*** 
                   
Step 1 (Model B)              -- --    
 Level of education  -0.07 0.01  -0.16* 0.03*  0.08 0.05**  -0.18* 0.24***     -0.03 0.13 
 BACS  -0.01      -0.24**         -0.30  
 WASI           -0.21*        
 MSCEIT-ME           -0.26**      0.26  
 SAPS           0.10      0.11  
 SANS                 0.15  
 ASRM                   
Step 2              -- --    
 Positive affect 
composite 
 -0.51*** 0.25***  -0.55*** 0.28***  -0.28*** 0.08***  -0.62*** 0.31***     -0.51*** 0.23*** 
Note. Sex only included in model for negative affect composite; males coded as 0 and females as 1. Only standardized betas are reported. M-Turk 
= Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. MDD = major depressive disorder. BD = bipolar disorder. SOPD = schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders. WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. MSCEIT-ME = Managing 
Emotions subscale of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = 
Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale. DES-P = positive emotions subscale of the 
Differential Emotions Scale. MASQ-AD = Anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. BDI-IA = revised 
version of the Beck Depression Inventory. PSI = Psychological Stress Index. STAI-S = state subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Index. DES-N = 
negative emotion subscale of the modified version of the Differential Emotions Scale.  PANAS-N = Negative Affect subscale of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule. MASQ-GD = The General Distress subscale of the 30-item version of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. 
SAS-SR = Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report and higher scores indicate poorer social functioning. Two versions of the SOPD group were 
organized (V1 = version one; V2 = version two) to maximize available data in Step 1. Negative affect group composite score for HC consisted of 
BDI-IA and DES-N; M-Turk consisted of STAI-S, BDI-IA, DES-N, and PANAS-N; MDD consisted of STAI-S and MASQ-GD; BD consisted of STAI-
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S, BDI-IA, DES-N, PSI, and PANAS-N; SOPD V1 and V2 consisted of BDI-IA and PSI. Positive affect group composite score for HC consisted of 
DES-P; M-Turk consisted of DES-P and PANAS-P; MDD consisted of MASQ-AD (reverse scored); BD consisted of DES-P and PANAS-P; SOPD 
V1 had no positive affect group composite score due to a lack of measures; SOPD V2 consisted of DES-P. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 2.1 
 
Note: Correlation between social functioning and negative or positive affect z-score for each group. HC = healthy control. M-Turk = Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. MDD = major depressive disorder. BD = bipolar disorder. SOPD = schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Social 
functioning impairment indexed by the Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report (SAS-SR); higher scores indicate social functioning impairment. The 
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composite negative affect or positive affect z-score was different for each group. Negative affect composite z-score for HC consisted of BDI-IA and 
DES-N; M-Turk consisted of State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S), revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-IA), negative subscale 
of the Differential Emotion Scale (DES-N), and the negative subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-N); MDD consisted of 
STAI-S and the General Distress subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-GD); BD consisted of STAI-S, BDI-IA, DES-
N, Psychological Stress Index (PSI), and PANAS-N; SOPD consisted of BDI-IA and PSI. Positive affect group composite z-score for HC consisted 
of DES-P; M-Turk consisted of the positive subscale of the Differential Emotion Scale (DES-P) and the positive subscale of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-P); MDD consisted of the Anhedonic Depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire 
(MASQ-AD; reverse scored); BD consisted of DES-P and PANAS-P; SOPD consisted of DES-P. Significant differences between Fisher r-to-z 
transformation for all pairwise comparisons are provided above and to the right of each row of graphs.
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Figure 2.2 
 
Note: Zero-order correlations between social functioning and all clinical variables across all participants. Correlations appear in order from smallest 
to largest (left to right). All correlations are significant (p < 0.05) except for SAPS (p = 0.051). ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale. WASI = 
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Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = Scale for the Assessment of 
Negative Symptoms. MSCEIT-ME = Managing Emotions branch of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. BACS = Brief 
Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. MASQ-GD = General Distress subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. PANAS-P = 
Positive affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. PANAS-N = Negative affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule. DES-N = Negative emotions subscale of the Differential Emotions Scale (modified version). DES-P = Positive emotions subscale of the 
Differential Emotions Scale (modified version). MASQ-AD = Anhedonic Depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. 
STAI-S = State anxiety subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. PSI = Psychological Stress Index. BDI-IA = Beck Depression Inventory 
(revised version). SAS-SR = Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report and higher scores indicate poorer social functioning. Sx = symptoms. The 
95% confidence interval is provided in brackets below the effect size of each measure.
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Figure 2.3 
 
Note: Group differences in negative and positive affect z-score. HC = healthy control. M-Turk = Amazon Mechanical Turk. MDD = Major 
depressive disorder. BD = Bipolar disorder. SOPD = Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. The composite negative affect or positive affect 
z-score was different for each group. Negative affect composite z-score for HC consisted of BDI-IA and DES-N; M-Turk consisted of State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S), revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-IA), negative subscale of the Differential Emotion Scale (DES-
N), and the negative subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-N); MDD consisted of STAI-S and the General Distress 
subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-GD); BD consisted of STAI-S, BDI-IA, DES-N, Psychological Stress Index 
(PSI), and PANAS-N; SOPD consisted of BDI-IA and PSI. Positive affect group composite z-score for HC consisted of DES-P; M-Turk consisted of 
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the positive subscale of the Differential Emotion Scale (DES-P) and the positive subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-
P); MDD consisted of the Anhedonic Depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-AD; reverse scored); BD 
consisted of DES-P and PANAS-P; SOPD consisted of DES-P. Tukey’s HSD results are indicated below the x-axis at the group label level; < = 
significantly less than all the groups to the right; no symbol between group labels indicates no significant group differences.
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Supplemental Table 2.1: Psychotropic medications within DSM-IV diagnostic groups 
 
MDD  
(n=279) 
BD  
(n=195) 
SOPD  
(n=245) 
t (df) or c2 
Daily CPZ equivalents in milligrams (SD) -- 438.0.4 (682.9) 968.5 (4292.4) 1.28 
Antipsychotics -- 93 (47.7%) 232 (94.7%) 124.25*** 
Mood stabilizers -- 121 (62.1%) 67 (27.3%) 53.44*** 
Antidepressants 133 (48.7%) 104 (53.3%) 110 (44.9%) 3.09 
Anxiolytics -- 41 (21.0%) 49 (20.0%) 0.07 
Note. CPZ = chlorpromazine. c2 = Pearson chi-square. DSM-IV = Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual on Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition. MDD = major depressive disorder. BD = bipolar 
disorder. SOPD = schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Only antidepressant medication 
data were available for MDD and these data were not available for six MDD. * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Supplemental Table 2.2: Pearson correlations between measures of negative/positive affect, neurocognition, general intelligence, social  
cognition, positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and mania among all participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Measures of negative and positive affect are numbered 1-9. Measures of clinical symptoms, intelligence, and cognition are numbered  
10-15. The numbering in the first column on the left begins with PANAS-P instead of MASQ-AD because participants who completed MASQ  
 1. DES-P 2. MASQ-AD 3. PANAS-P 4. STAI-S 5. BDI-IA 6. DES-N 7. PSI 8. PANAS-N 9. MASQ-GD 
3. PANAS-P 0.69*** 
(n=400) 
--        
4. STAI-S -0.63*** 
(n=521) 
0.61*** 
(n=301) 
 
-0.48*** 
(n=400) 
 
      
5. BDI-IA -0.57*** 
(n=510) 
-- 
 
-0.36*** 
(n=401) 
0.73*** 
(n=639) 
     
6. DES-N -0.41*** 
(n=529) 
-- 
 
-0.20*** 
(n=400) 
0.70*** 
(n=521) 
0.71*** 
(n=510) 
    
7. PSI -0.67*** 
(n=253) 
-- 
 
-0.53*** 
(n=143) 
0.67*** 
(n=383) 
0.70*** 
(n=515) 
0.69*** 
(n=253) 
   
8. PANAS-N -0.38*** 
(n=400) 
-- 
 
-0.17*** 
(n=401) 
0.76*** 
(n=400) 
0.72*** 
(n=401) 
0.75*** 
(n=400) 
0.66*** 
(n=143) 
  
9. MASQ-GD -- 0.67*** 
(n=302) 
-- 
 
0.60*** 
(n=319) 
-- -- --   
10. BACS 0.29** 
(n=126) 
-- -- -0.43*** 
(n=205) 
-0.34*** 
(n=309) 
-0.32*** 
(n=126) 
-0.32*** 
(n=309) 
-- -- 
11. WASI 0.10 
(n=139) 
-0.01 
(n=260) 
-0.01 
(n=139) 
-0.12* 
(n=416) 
-0.30*** 
(n=139) 
-0.28*** 
(n=139) 
-0.11 
(n=138) 
-0.32*** 
(n=139) 
-0.01 
(n=277) 
12. MSCEIT ME 0.25*** 
(n=248) 
-- 
 
0.31*** 
(n=144) 
-0.32*** 
(n=294) 
-0.30*** 
(n=308) 
-0.22*** 
(n=248) 
-0.27*** 
(n=308) 
-0.21* 
(n=144) 
-- 
13. SAPS -0.15 
(n=66) 
-- -- 0.26* 
(n=65) 
0.34** 
(n=66) 
0.27* 
(n=66) 
0.16 
(n=66) 
-- -- 
14. SANS -0.21 
(n=76) 
-- -- 0.22* 
(n=121) 
0.20* 
(n=113) 
0.19 
(n=76) 
-0.01 
(n=113) 
-- -- 
15. ASRM 0.18* 
(n=159) 
-- 
 
0.32*** 
(n=144) 
0.12 
(n=204) 
0.19** 
(n=204) 
0.12 
(n=159) 
0.02 
(n=204) 
0.18* 
(n=144) 
-- 
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did not complete DES and thus there is no correlation to test. MASQ-GD = General Distress subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire. PANAS-P = Positive affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. PANAS-N = Negative affect subscale of  
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. DES-N = Negative emotions subscale of the Differential Emotions Scale (modified version).  
DES-P = Positive emotions subscale of the Differential Emotions Scale (modified version). MASQ-AD = Anhedonic Depression subscale of  
the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. STAI-S = State anxiety subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. PSI = Psychological  
Stress Index. BDI-IA = Beck Depression Inventory (revised version). BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. WASI =  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. MSCEIT-ME = Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. SAPS = Scale for the  
Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Supplemental Table 2.3: Hierarchical regression models of individual measures of negative/positive affect predicting social functioning  
(SAS-SR) variance within each group 
 
Note. Only standardized betas are reported. HC = healthy control. M-Turk = Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. MDD = major depressive 
disorder. BD = bipolar disorder. SOPD = schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. WASI = Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. BACS 
= Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. MSCEIT-ME = Managing Emotions subscale of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test. SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms. ASRM = 
   HC  M-Turk  MDD  BD  SOPD 
   (n=40)  (n=253)  (n=203)  (n=134)  V1 (n=189)  V2 (n=46) 
   Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model  Variable Model 
   b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2  b ΔR2 
Step 1                   
 Level of education  -0.10 0.05  -0.16* 0.03*  0.08 0.06**  -0.19* 0.27***  -0.03 0.04*  -0.09 0.16 
 Sex  -0.23   -0.03   0.12   0.18*   0.18*   0.18  
 BACS  0.02      -0.23**      -0.09   -0.31  
 WASI           -0.19*        
 MSCEIT-ME           -0.31***      0.28  
 SAPS                 0.09  
 SANS                 0.18  
 ASRM           0.12        
Step 2 (Model A)                   
 STAI-S      0.66*** 0.43***  0.21** 0.04**  0.66*** 0.37***       
Step 2 (Model B)                   
 BDI-IA  0.61*** 0.36***  0.74*** 0.55***     0.69*** 0.37***  0.70*** 0.47***  0.67*** 0.32*** 
Step 2 (Model C)                   
 DES-N  0.34* 0.09*  0.52*** 0.27***     0.60*** 0.29***       
Step 2 (Model D)                   
 PSI           0.60*** 0.33***  0.56*** 0.30***  0.49** 0.18** 
Step 2 (Model E)                   
 PANAS-N     0.49*** 0.24***     0.58*** 0.27***       
Step 2 (Model F)                   
 MASQ-GD        0.34*** 0.12***          
                   
Step 1                   
 Level of education  -0.07 0.01  -0.16* 0.03*  0.08 0.05**  -0.19* 0.24***     -0.05 0.13 
 BACS  -0.01      -0.24**         -0.31  
 WASI           -0.21*        
 MSCEIT-ME           -0.26**      0.24  
 SAPS                 0.12  
 SANS                 0.17  
 ASRM           0.11        
Step 2 (Model A)                   
 DES-P  -0.51** 0.25**  -0.58*** 0.33**     -0.62*** 0.32***     -0.50*** 0.21*** 
Step 2 (Model B)                   
 PANAS-P     -0.40*** 0.15***     -0.52*** 0.21***       
Step 2 (Model C)                   
 MASQ-AD        -0.28*** 0.08***          
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Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale. DES-P = positive emotions subscale of the Differential Emotions Scale. MASQ-AD = Anhedonic depression 
subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (reverse scored). BDI-IA = revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory. PSI = 
Psychological Stress Index. STAI-S = state subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Index. DES-N = negative emotion subscale of the modified version 
of the Differential Emotions Scale.  PANAS-N = Negative Affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. MASQ-GD = The General 
Distress subscale of the 30-item version of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. SAS-SR = Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report and 
higher scores indicate poorer functioning. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Supplemental Table 2.4: Effect sizes (r) from simple regression models of composite and individual negative/ 
positive affect measures predicting social functioning impairment (SAS-SR) variance within each group 
   HC  M-Turk  MDD  BD  SOPD 
   (n=40)  (n=253)  (n=203)  (n=134)  V1 
(n=189) 
 V2 
(n=46) 
             
 Negative affect composite  0.48***  0.70***  0.34***  0.80***  0.71***  0.66*** 
 Positive affect composite  0.49***  0.55***  0.27***  0.59***  --  0.52*** 
              
 Negative affect measures             
   STAI-S    0.67***  0.22**  0.75***     
   BDI-IA  0.63***  0.75***    0.77***  0.71***  0.65*** 
   DES-N  0.34*  0.52***    0.71***     
   PSI        0.68***  0.57***  0.69*** 
   PANAS-N    0.49***    0.69***     
   MASQ-GD      0.35***       
              
 Positive affect measures             
   DES-P  0.49**  0.59***    0.40***    0.52*** 
   PANAS-P    0.41***    0.48***     
   MASQ-AD      0.27***       
Note. Only standardized betas are reported. HC = healthy control. M-Turk = Amazon Mechanical Turk participants.  
MDD = major depressive disorder. BD = bipolar disorder. SOPD = schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders.  
BDI-IA = revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory. PSI = Psychological Stress Index. STAI-S = state subscale  
of the State-Trait Anxiety Index. DES-N = negative emotion subscale of the modified version of the Differential Emotions  
Scale.  PANAS-N = Negative Affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. MASQ-GD = The General  
Distress subscale of the 30-item version of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. DES-P = positive emotions  
subscale of the Differential Emotions Scale. PANAS-P = Positive Affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect  
Schedule. MASQ-AD = Anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. SAS-SR =  
Social Adjustment Scale – Self-Report and higher scores indicate poorer social functioning. Two versions of the SOPD  
group were organized (V1 = version one; V2 = version two) to maximize available data in Step 1. Negative affect group  
composite score for HC consisted of BDI-IA and DES-N; M-Turk consisted of STAI-S, BDI-IA, DES-N, and PANAS-N;  
MDD consisted of STAI-S and MASQ-GD; BD consisted of STAI-S, BDI-IA, DES-N, PSI, and PANAS-N; SOPD V1 and  
V2 consisted of BDI-IA and PSI. Positive affect group composite score for HC consisted of DES-P; M-Turk consisted of  
DES-P and PANAS-P; MDD consisted of MASQ-AD (reverse scored); BD consisted of DES-P and PANAS-P; SOPD V1  
had no positive affect group composite score due to a lack of measures; SOPD V2 consisted of DES-P. * p < 0.05,  
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Study 2. Paranoia and the localization of auditory environmental stimuli in 
schizophrenia  
 
Abstract 
Sound localization aides in the detection of threats in the physical and social 
environment. In schizophrenia (SZ) – a disorder characterized by paranoid thinking and 
a bias towards threat (e.g., interpreting emotionally neutral stimuli as threatening) – 
evidence suggests that sound localization is impaired and may contribute to functional 
deficits. Yet, the factors that contribute to this deficit beyond general cognitive function 
are relatively unknown. It is possible that sound localization of environmental stimuli is 
related to paranoia, as such stimuli may evoke threat and improve localization to detect 
threats. To determine whether the ability to localize environmental stimuli is a function of 
paranoia, 20 participants with SZ and 22 healthy controls (HC) performed a sound 
localization task where environmental stimuli were played by eight speakers on a 360-
degree horizontal plane and localized. Participants also completed a self-report 
measure of paranoia in addition to a brief cognitive assessment. SZ performed 
significantly worse in localizing auditory stimuli than HC. Heightened paranoia in SZ was 
associated with reduced sound localization impairment, even after accounting for 
general cognitive function. These findings suggest that sound localization 
impairment of environmental stimuli is characteristic of SZ, and that paranoia plays a 
role in sound localization in SZ. 
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Introduction 
Detecting threats within the physical and social environment is necessary to 
survival. One such tool used to detect threats in the environment is localization of 
auditory stimuli. The ability to properly localize sounds involves judgment of sound 
origin (i.e., direction and distance) using binaural cues (e.g., time and level differences 
between ears) and monaural cues such as spectral information (e.g., frequency; Slee & 
Young, 2013) that are processed within the auditory system and primary auditory cortex 
of the brain (Middlebrooks, 2015). In schizophrenia (SZ) – a chronic mental disorder 
characterized by excessive or irrational ideas of threat (i.e., paranoia; Freeman, 2007) – 
sound localization impairment has been observed (Balogh & Leventhal, 1982; Balogh, 
Schuck, & Leventhal, 1979; Matthews, Todd, Budd, Cooper, & Michie, 2007; Perrin et 
al., 2010). Previous research has identified a relationship between heightened paranoid 
thinking and cognitive and sensory processing deficits in SZ (Bentall et al., 2009; van 
der Gaag, 2006), suggesting that reduced cognition and abnormal sensory processing 
may contribute to the formation and maintenance of false beliefs (Maher, 2005). For 
example, SZ who experience sensory abnormalities stemming from primary auditory 
cortex pathophysiology (e.g., sound localization deficits) and cognitive deficits (e.g., 
executive function impairment) may be prone to paranoid thinking in the face of 
threatening events. This may cause SZ to misinterpret the environment (e.g., it sounds 
as though someone is behind me and ready to attack; Asutay & Vastfjall, 2015; Bach, 
Neuhoff, Perrig, & Seifritz, 2009; Bertels, Kolinsky, Coucke, & Morais, 2013) and lead to 
a vicious cycle of heightened paranoia. Inversely, heightened paranoia in SZ may 
increase attention and orienting response (e.g., increased auditory sensitivity) towards 
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non-salient environmental stimuli (Blair & Martaindale, 2014; DeGangi, 2017; Moritz & 
Laudan, 2007). Both heightened attention and orienting response could lead to 
improved sound localization to detect threats, possibly in those with intact cognitive 
resources. Thus, it is unclear if heightened paranoia would enhance or disrupt 
localization of environmental sounds, and it may depend on one’s cognitive functioning. 
While sound localization studies of SZ have shown impairments compared with healthy 
controls (HC), and this deficit is related to impaired cognition (Matthews et al., 2007; 
Perrin et al., 2010), no studies have examined its relationship with both paranoia and 
cognition. If deficits in sound localization are observed in SZ, and these deficits are 
related to both paranoia and cognition, the effectiveness of psychosocial treatments 
designed to improve auditory system functioning via sound localization training 
paradigms may be impacted by levels of paranoia and cognitive function.  
Despite the potential for natural sounds that occur within a social context (e.g., 
people talking or laughing) to elicit threat or paranoia, the impact of affective valence 
and arousal level of stimuli on localization is relatively unknown, as previous studies 
have required HC and SZ to localize only neutral laboratory stimuli such as tones or 
single-frequencies (Balogh & Leventhal, 1982; Balogh et al., 1979; Perrin et al., 2010). 
Further, these studies have used a limited localization range (e.g., only a front 
horizontal or 180-degree plane) and not a full 360-degree horizontal plane, despite the 
possibility of real-world threats coming from various locations, including sounds from 
behind. In particular, there is a phenomenon of front/back ambiguity due to typical 
localization cues being nearly identical (i.e., time and level differences between the ears 
can be virtually the same; Middlebrooks, 2015) and this ambiguity, along with 
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localization in general, may be further complicated by one’s affective response to 
environmental stimuli. For instance, studies that have examined auditory processing 
using affective stimuli have been shown that unpleasant or pleasant stimuli, but not 
neutral stimuli, may elicit enhanced auditory attention compared with neutral stimuli 
(Brockelmann et al., 2011), but unpleasant compared with pleasant sounds may also 
impair spatial attention orientating (Bertels et al., 2013). In addition, identification of 
unpleasant and pleasant auditory stimuli may be slower compared with neutral auditory 
stimuli (Kryklywy, Macpherson, Greening, & Mitchell, 2013). Thus, auditory processing 
in terms of sound localization may not only be impacted by levels of paranoia but also 
affective processing (i.e., valence and/or arousal) of environmental stimuli.  
Yet, no studies have explored the relationship between the localization of 
affective environmental sounds on a 360-degree horizontal plane and paranoid thinking. 
Thus, the current study examined sound localization of auditory environmental stimuli 
that varied by valence, arousal, and location along a 360-degree horizontal plane in SZ 
and HC. Based on previous findings of impaired sound localization in SZ relative to 
healthy individuals (Balogh, 1979; Perrin, 2010), we predicted significant group 
differences in overall sound localization accuracy, with SZ performing worse than HC. 
We also predicted a relationship between sound localization and paranoia while 
accounting for general cognition in SZ, with the possibility of heightened paranoia being 
associated with improved or reduced sound localization performance. Due to the lack of 
available data in the current literature, we explored if sound localization varied 
according to valence and/or arousal within or between each group. 
Methods 
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 Participants 
  
A total of 20 SZ and 22 HC completed the study. A Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) diagnosis of schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder or absence of an 
Axis I diagnosis was established using the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV 
(SCID-IV; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997). SZ were recruited via a university 
research registry, mental health clinics, other research studies, and advertisements. SZ 
who were unable to provide informed consent or had a history of substance 
dependence/abuse in the past 12 months were excluded. HC with a history of a DSM-IV 
Axis I diagnosis, significant medical conditions that affect brain functions, or family 
history of psychosis or mania among first-degree relatives were excluded. All 
participants were 21-65 years of age with no history of auditory impairment. The study 
was conducted in accordance with the World Medical Association Declaration of 
Helsinki and the research protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of 
the University of Michigan Medical School. Written informed consent was obtained from 
each participant prior to data collection.   
Procedure 
SZ were first diagnostically and clinically assessed with the SCID-P, SAPS, 
SANS, and YMRS. HC participants were diagnostically assessed with the SCID-NP. All 
participants completed a neurocognitive assessment. All diagnostic, clinical, and 
cognitive assessments were conducted by a clinical psychology doctoral student. All 
participants then completed self-report measures of mood, anxiety, and paranoia, 
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followed by the sound localization paradigm. Participants also completed a probabilistic 
reasoning paradigm not reported here.  
Auditory stimuli  
Forty-eight environmental stimuli from the International Affective Digitized 
Sounds (IADS; Bradley, 2007) were selected to create three valence categories 
(pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant) for the sound localization task. Examples of IADS 
stimuli include a baby crying and a babbling brook. Bradley (2007) used the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994) to determine both pleasantness (i.e., 
valence) and excitement (i.e., arousal) on a Likert scale from one to nine. Higher 
valence or arousal ratings indicate more unpleasantness or excitement, respectively. 
Based on the valence ratings of Bradley (2007), cut-offs for each category were 
established and 16 pleasant stimuli (valence cut-off > 5.5; mean valence = 6.8 and 
mean arousal = 5.2), 16 neutral stimuli (valence cut-off >= 4.5 and <= 5.5; mean 
valence = 5.0 and mean arousal = 4.8), and 16 unpleasant stimuli (valence cut-off < 4.5; 
mean valence = 2.6 and mean arousal = 6.6) were selected for the current study. Mean 
arousal level of the unpleasant stimuli was not matched to neutral or pleasant stimuli 
due to a lack of IADS unpleasant stimuli that do not elicit higher levels of arousal (e.g., 
low valence and arousal stimuli are limited to sounds of sexual intercourse). 
Considering that each IADS stimulus is up to six seconds in duration, and that most 
localization paradigms use stimuli lasting one second or less (cf. Bednar, Boland, & 
Lalor, 2017; Lewald, Hanenberg, & Getzmann, 2016), all stimuli were trimmed to one 
second in duration to ensure that any differences in principle findings of this study and 
previous studies are not due to differences in stimuli duration. The 48 trimmed stimuli 
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were then confirmed to have valence ratings similar to Bradley (2007) via valence and 
arousal ratings completed by 11 members of our research lab using the same Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994) rating scale as Bradley (2007). These 
ratings are referred to as the standardized valence and arousal ratings in the rest of this 
report, with the pleasant sounds having a mean valence rating of 6.4 (mean arousal = 
4.9), neutral sounds a mean valence of 5.1 (mean arousal = 4.7), and unpleasant 
sounds a mean valence of 2.6 (mean arousal = 6.4).  
Valence/Arousal ratings  
Participants were placed in a seat in the center of a circle located within the 
sound localization room. Prior to performing the sound localization task, they first 
listened to the 48 sound stimuli with headphones and rated each for valence and 
arousal using a Likert scale from one to nine on a Mac computer running MATLAB 
software (Mathworks, Inc.). Lower values for valence and arousal indicated pleasant 
valence or lower arousal, respectively. 
Sound localization task 
After completing the valence/arousal ratings, participants remained seated in the 
center of the circle with a radius of 3 feet. A circular apparatus standing three feet tall 
was lined with 16 evenly distributed speakers along the circumference (Figure 1). Eight 
of the speakers (placed at 45, 90, 135, 180, 225, 270, 315, and 360 degrees) were 
active and the other eight were inactive decoy speakers (placed at 22.5, 67.5, 112.5, 
147.5, 202.5, 247.5, 292.5, and 337.5 degrees). The 48 sounds were presented, one at 
a time, in a pseudorandom order from one of the eight active speakers, such that each 
speaker presented six sounds in total. Each sound was presented at approximately 60 
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decibels or the level of normal conversation. Participants were instructed to identify the 
location of each sound by clicking on a spot along the circumference of a circle 
representing the speaker configuration on the screen of a Mac computer placed in front 
of them (Figure 1). Speakers were not identified or represented on this circle, and 
participants could click anywhere on this circle, allowing for the measurement of sound 
localization as a continuous variable. A chinrest was used to keep participants’ head 
centered in relation to the speakers. All stimuli were presented using a Mac computer 
running MATLAB software (Figure 1). Immediately before the sound localization task, 
eight different IADS stimuli were localized during a practice session to reduce learning 
effects. 
Self-report questionnaires 
All participants completed the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; 
Green et al., 2008), which includes subscale assessments of Ideas of Reference and 
Persecution. Levels of depression and anxiety were assessed with the revised version 
of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-IA; Beck & Steer, 1993) and the state subscale 
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983), respectively. 
Cognitive and clinical assessment 
Cognition was assessed using the Brief Assessment of Cognition in 
Schizophrenia (BACS; Keefe, 1999), which includes domains of working memory, 
processing speed, and executive function. Within SZ only, overall positive symptoms 
were assessed with the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; 
Andreasen, 1984b), and a detailed assessment of auditory hallucinations was 
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performed with the Auditory Hallucinations Rating Scale (AHRS; Haddock, 1994). Also 
in SZ only, negative symptoms were assessed with the Scale for the Assessment of 
Negative Symptoms (SANS; Andreasen, 1984a). 
Data Analyses 
 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the groups were compared with chi-
square or simple t-test (Table 1).  
Valence and arousal ratings over the 48 stimuli were computed for each 
participant. To determine group differences in valence/arousal ratings, mean valence 
and arousal ratings of the three categories (i.e., pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant) were 
compared between SZ and HC using simple t-tests. Using the previous cut-offs for 
valence categories (pleasant > 5.5; neutral between 4.5 and 5.5; and unpleasant < 4.5), 
both groups rated IADS stimuli similar to Bradley (2007) and our research lab: HC 
pleasant mean = 7.0 (arousal mean = 4.0), neutral mean = 5.0 (arousal mean = 3.7), 
and unpleasant mean = 2.6 (arousal mean = 5.7); SZ pleasant mean = 7.3 (arousal 
mean = 4.3), neutral mean = 5.0 (arousal mean = 4.4), and unpleasant mean = 2.5 
(arousal mean = 6.0). HC rated 40.9% of stimuli as pleasant, 25.9% neutral, and 33.2% 
unpleasant. SZ rated 41.4% of stimuli as pleasant, 18.9% neutral, and 39.7% 
unpleasant. To determine group differences in valence/arousal ratings, mean valence 
and arousal ratings of the three categories (i.e., pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant) were 
compared between SZ and HC using simple t-tests. Mean valence ratings for pleasant, 
neutral, and unpleasant sounds were not significantly different between HC and SZ (p’s 
> 0.05). Mean arousal ratings for each of the three valence categories were also not 
significantly different between HC and SZ (p’s > 0.05). Mean valence and arousal 
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ratings were not significantly different between HC and SZ, t(40) = -0.28, p = 0.784, and 
t(40) = 1.33, p = 0.192, respectively, even after removing one HC outlier for valence (3 
standard deviations above the group mean; Supplemental Figure 1). Supplemental 
Figure 2 provides a scatterplot of each IADS stimuli mapped onto valence and arousal, 
along with a scatterplot of IADS stimuli with a mean rating difference of one or more for 
valence and/or arousal. 
Sound localization performance was measured by absolute error— click distance 
in degrees from the correct speaker. Although click distance to that was counter-
clockwise to the correct speaker was recorded as negative and clockwise positive, 
absolute value allows for proper assessment of performance, as raw error includes both 
negative and positive values and could cancel out error across trials. For example, the 
addition of a -45-degree and a 45-degree error would equal zero, which is an incorrect 
representation of the performance. Thus, deviation from either direction (click distance 
left or right of the correct speaker) is coded the same. The range of absolute error was 0 
to 180 degrees for each trial.  
Since sound localization on a 360-degree horizontal plane can result in 
front/back ambiguity due to the lack of time and intensity cues (e.g., sounds from the 
back are thought to come from the front), the number of these “reversals” was counted 
(i.e., all errors over 90 degrees were counted) for each participant. Because of the use 
of absolute values, along with a high propensity to accurately localize sounds but also 
experience “reversals”, performance data of individual trials approximate a gamma 
distribution (i.e., all values are non-negative values with high concentration near zero 
and a long right tail). Generalized linear mixed models (GLM) were used to determine if 
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group differences in absolute error at the individual trial level varied by valence/arousal. 
These models have the option to select the distribution of the dependent variable, which 
in this case is a gamma distribution based on visual inspection of a histogram and 
confirmed by comparing the information criterion (i.e., AIC and BIC) of models with a 
normal versus gamma distribution. A value of one was artificially added to each 
absolute error value, as GLM using SPSS software with a gamma distribution requires 
non-zero values (IBM, 2018). In all cases, GLM with a gamma distribution had the 
winning information criteria over GLM with a normal distribution, confirming that the data 
is best modeled as a gamma distribution. In the first GLM, group (HC or SZ) and 
individual participant ratings of valence and arousal were entered as fixed effects 
predicting sound localization absolute error. In the second GLM, group and 
standardized ratings of valence and arousal as determined by Bradley (2007) and 
confirmed by our 11 lab members were entered as fixed effects predicting sound 
localization error. GLM were run with main effects, and all possible interactions of main 
effects were entered individually. Only significant interactions were included in the final 
winning model, which was selected based on the model information criteria (i.e., AIC 
and BIC). 
To explore for group differences in front/back ambiguity, a simple t-test was used 
to compare the frequency of reversals between SZ and HC.  
Pearson and Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis was used to examine 
the relationship between mean absolute error in the localization task and GPTS and 
BACS, along with clinical assessments (SAPS and AHRS) in SZ. Partial correlation 
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analysis was used to explore the relationship between mean absolute error and GPTS 
while controlling for BACS in SZ. 
Results 
Sound localization 
The results of GLM showed that sound localization performance was significantly 
worse in SZ compared with HC. The results of GLM also showed that there were no 
sound localization differences according to individual valence and/or arousal ratings of 
stimuli across participants. However, there were sound localization differences among 
stimuli according to standardized valence and arousal ratings, along with an interaction 
between these valence and arousal ratings (Table 2). Specifically, reduced valence and 
arousal were associated with better localization performance. An interaction plot was 
created to illustrate the valence/arousal interaction by artificially separating valence into 
pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant categories using the previous cut-offs (pleasant > 5.5; 
neutral between 4.5 and 5.5; and unpleasant < 4.5) and preserving arousal as a 
continuous variable (Figure 4). Beta estimate suggested that each one unit increase of 
valence results in a 1.03 unit of decrease in the relationship between arousal and 
absolute error. That is, the effect of arousal on absolute error increases as valence 
becomes more unpleasant across participants.  
There was a significant negative correlation between mean absolute error and 
GPTS in SZ but not HC (top of Figure 2). There was no significant correlation between 
mean absolute error and BACS in SZ or HC (bottom of Figure 2). Partial correlation 
analysis showed that the relationship between mean absolute error and GPTS in SZ 
remained significant after controlling for BACS (Figure 3). Among SZ, there were no 
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significant correlations between mean absolute error and SAPS, r(20) = -0.30, p = 0.195 
and rs(20) = -0.29, p = 0.22; or AHRS, r(20) = 0.16, p = 0.493, and rs(20) = 0.10, p = 
0.674.  
As expected, for both groups the distribution of error showed “reversals” where 
sounds originating from the back speaker were incorrectly localized as coming from the 
front speaker (i.e., ~180 degrees away). The percentage of reversals was significantly 
higher in SZ (9.0%) compared with HC (5.7%), t(40) = 2.23, p = 0.032. 
Discussion 
 
The current study examined the localization of auditory environmental stimuli and 
the relationship between sound localization and paranoia in people with schizophrenia 
and those with no history of mental illness. It was found that SZ performed significantly 
worse during a sound localization paradigm than HC. Levels of paranoia were 
associated with sound localization deficits in SZ, such that the greatest sound 
localization deficits were observed in those with reduced levels of paranoia. SZ with 
heightened paranoia had the highest sound localization accuracy, even after accounting 
for cognitive function. Considering that there were no differences in localization 
according to individual ratings of valence and/or arousal of environmental stimuli for 
both groups, it’s possible that SZ with higher levels of paranoia experience an 
attentional bias to threat that enhances localization of sounds regardless of the 
valence/arousal elicited by stimuli, as more cognitive resources may be allocated 
towards possible or perceived threats. Specifically, enhanced auditory processing via an 
involuntary orienting response that is triggered by changes in the environment and 
ensures optimal perception of stimuli (Blair & Martaindale, 2014; DeGangi, 2017) and 
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involuntary attention towards stimuli in conditions that evoke threat (Dominguez-Borras, 
Rieger, Corradi-Dell'Acqua, Neveu, & Vuilleumier, 2017; Lv, Wang, Tu, Zheng, & Qiu, 
2011) may accompany heightened paranoia and cognitive processing of both 
threatening and non-salient stimuli in SZ (Freeman, 2007). 
Further, sound localization impairment in SZ was in part driven by front-to-back 
ambiguity resulting in ‘reversals’ where sounds from the front were incorrectly localized 
as coming from the back. While SZ made significantly more of these errors than HC, 
both groups experienced reversals, and this may have been caused by 
indistinguishable localization cues for sounds coming from the front or back. Sound 
intensity and time differences between the ears are almost identical for sounds coming 
from the front or back. In these situations, localizers must rely more heavily on spectral 
features of stimuli (i.e., a range in the intensity of frequencies) that are detected by the 
direction-dependent filtering effects of the head and ears. All of these cues must be 
integrated and assigned salience. Moreover, looking towards the source of auditory 
stimuli improves localization (Keating & King, 2015; Middlebrooks, 2015), which 
participants in the current study were not able to do during stimuli presented from the 
back (or sides). All of these factors (i.e., sound intensity, time difference between the 
ears, and fixed head position) may explain why sounds coming from the front were not 
‘reversed’ nearly as often as sounds coming from the back. Considering the relationship 
between heightened paranoia and improved overall localization in SZ, along with 
reversals contributing to absolute error, it is possible that increased sensory resources 
that come with threat and salience (e.g., orienting response) aid in the detection of 
spectral cues, which may help to reduce reversals in SZ with heightened paranoia. In 
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addition, prior experience and behavioral goals are unexplored areas of sound 
localization that may contribute to performance (Keating & King, 2015). Heightened 
paranoia may provide further motivation to interpret the environment, resulting in a 
larger allocation of sensory/cognitive resources.  
Finally, the causal relationship between sound localization and paranoia in SZ is 
currently unknown. Previous findings of abnormal sensory experiences leading to 
paranoia (e.g., heightened paranoia has been reported in older adults with hearing loss; 
Freeman, 2007), suggest a cascading effect of sensory abnormalities leading to 
heightened paranoia. However, the current findings do not support this cascading effect, 
rather, heightened paranoia may enhance attention and orienting response localization 
despite sound localization deficits in SZ relative to HC. Induction studies could help 
determine the causal relationship between localization and paranoia in clinical groups. If 
localization performance was worse in the neutral induction group compared with the 
paranoia induction group, it would suggest that heightened paranoia positively impacts 
sound localization.   
To our knowledge, this is first study to examine sound localization of 
environmental stimuli in SZ. Previous studies have examined localization of tones or 
single frequencies rather than more spectrally complex stimuli that occur naturally in the 
environment and found localization deficits in SZ were related to a pattern of localization 
impairment in both right and left hemifields similar to those with right superior temporal 
lobe lesions that include the primary auditory cortex (Perrin et al., 2010). Previous 
reports have identified sound lateralization abnormalities due to interaural processing 
impairment of time and phase but not other spatial information such as loudness, which 
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suggest localization impairment maybe driven by impaired processing of temporal 
interaural cues. This selective deficit lends itself to the current findings, as temporal 
cues help to localize stimuli in more complex environments and thus natural settings 
that include both high and low frequency auditory information. Neural firing 
abnormalities in the auditory system and precuneus may explain temporal interaural 
deficits (Matthews et al., 2007; Zundorf, Lewald, & Karnath, 2013). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the sound localization impairment observed in the current 
study may be related to impairment of the primary auditory cortex and auditory system 
in SZ. While the current study found no relationship between overall cognitive function 
(i.e., working memory, processing speed, and executive function) and sound 
localization, more specific assessment of the auditory system and related regions 
necessary for both auditory processing and sensory integration may be needed. 
Further, since the current study examines only behavioral data, biological abnormalities 
can only be speculated, and future studies are needed to explore this hypothesis using 
psychophysiological techniques (e.g., event related potential) during sound localization 
paradigms. Further, improving functioning of the auditory system in SZ via existing 
sound localization training paradigms may lead to reduced sound localization 
impairment and functioning, although heightened paranoia status may impact training 
effectiveness (i.e., SZ with reduced levels of paranoia may experience the greatest 
localization gains from such training paradigms).    
The current study found differences in sound localization according to 
standardized but not individual ratings of valence and/or arousal for both SZ and HC. 
For sounds with standardized ratings of valence/arousal, better localization performance 
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was related to more unpleasant or less arousing sounds, along with an increased effect 
of arousal on performance with more unpleasant sounds. Previous reports suggest that 
auditory processing differences in unpleasant or pleasant compared with neutral 
standardized stimuli may be explained by enhanced auditory attention (Bertels et al., 
2013; Brockelmann et al., 2011; Kryklywy et al., 2013). Within the current study, the 
pattern of performance for both groups may indicate enhanced auditory attention to 
sounds that are both unpleasant and less arousing (e.g., someone saying “ouch” after a 
non-severe injury). Yet for individual ratings of valence and arousal, the previous pattern 
was not found, and the lack of differences in sound localization according to 
valence/arousal suggest that attention is enhanced towards all stimuli, rather than 
stimuli that may be perceived as threatening due to the elicited valence or arousal of the 
stimuli (especially for SZ with heightened paranoia). Previous research has also found 
support for this hypothesis, as a threat bias may generalize to all stimuli depending on 
the context (Dominguez Mde, Viechtbauer, Simons, van Os, & Krabbendam, 2009). 
Sensory resources and salience may be assigned to benign or irrelevant stimuli that is 
perceived as threatening via the orienting response, which would support aberrant 
salience models of psychosis (Lau, Wang, Hsu, & Liu, 2013). While there are no studies 
that have compared standardized categories of valence/arousal with individual ratings in 
SZ and HC, the current findings also suggest that standardized ratings may have limited 
generalizability to both clinical populations and those with no history of mental illness 
(e.g., IADS ratings are based on a college population).   
The current sound localization paradigm was limited by the use of an echoic 
room. However, sound absorbing material was placed in the corners of the localization 
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room to reduce echoes. Speakers were also calibrated periodically to ensure speaker 
volumes were approximately 60 decibels. Stimuli were randomly played for each 
participant, meaning no pattern of sounds was the same, thereby eliminating the 
probability of a speaker location or specific speaker leading to the current findings. 
However, differences in spectral composition of single-frequency auditory stimuli versus 
the complexity of auditory environmental stimuli also complicate the interpretation of the 
current findings. It is also possible that the IADS stimuli used in the current study, which 
were categorized by valence and not balanced for arousal, impacted the results. Less 
arousing sounds were typically more pleasant and more arousing sounds were typically 
more unpleasant, and arousal levels for pleasant and neutral did not match the arousal 
level for unpleasant sounds, creating a possible confound. It is possible that the 
observed the effect of standardized arousal on sound localization error would not exist if 
unpleasant but low arousal sounds were used. Replication of the current findings with 
stimuli balanced for both valence and arousal using a larger sample size is needed.       
The findings of the current study suggest that impaired localization of 
environmental sounds is characteristic of schizophrenia compared with healthy controls. 
Within SZ, it was found that lower levels of paranoia were associated with sound 
localization impairment while higher levels of paranoia were associated with improved 
sound localization, even after accounting for cognitive function. It is possible that 
heightened paranoia may lead to a shift in cognitive resources towards threat detection 
via localization of environmental sounds regardless of valence/arousal.  
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Table 3.1: Demographic and baseline clinical measures for all participants 
  HC 
(n=22) 
 SZ  
(n=20) 
 t/Chi-
square/ 
FETa 
Age in years (SD)  42.9 (14.8)  40.8 (13.0)  -0.66 
Sex (Male/Female)  12/10  10/10  0.09 
Years of education  16.7 (2.3)  15.0 (1.9)  -2.75** 
Race (White/Other)  16/6  13/7  0.29 
Handedness (Right/Left)  22/0  17/3  0.10 
       
BACS  0.0 (1.0)  -0.55 (0.75)  -2.02* 
       
BDI-IA  0.8 (1.6)  8.6 (6.6)  5.37*** 
STAI-S  26.5 (4.1)  36.9 (9.6)  4.83*** 
       
GPTS  34.5 (4.6)  56.3 (27.1)  3.96*** 
       
SCID-IV diagnosis (SZ/SA)    9/11   
Number of hospitalizations    4.4 (3.3)   
Duration of illness (years)    15.2 (7.0)   
SAPS    5.1 (3.6)   
SANS    5.6 (3.1)   
AHRS    12.8 (12.4)   
Note: FET = Fisher’s Exact Test and the statistic provided is table probability.  
BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia composite z-score.  
BDI-IA = revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory. STAI-S = state  
subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. GPTS = Green et al. Paranoid  
Thoughts Scale. SCID-IV = Structured Clinical Interview for the Fourth Edition  
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. SZ =  
schizophrenia. SA = schizoaffective. SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of  
Positive Symptoms. SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative  
Symptoms. AHRS = Auditory Hallucination Rating Scale. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of final generalized linear mixed models for sound localization via  
absolute error by group, valence, and arousal 
 Individual 
valence/arousal 
 Standardized 
valence/arousal 
 Absolute errora  Absolute errora 
Tests for Model Effects (Wald Chi-Square)    
Intercept 84.9***  0.81 
Group (HC or SZ) 32.21***  27.05*** 
Valence 0.60  7.83** 
Arousal 0.58  8.28** 
Valence*Arousal --  6.74** 
    
Parameter Estimatesb b (s.e.)  b (s.e.) 
Intercept 31.31 (3.19)***  -7.15 (11.95) 
Group (HC) -8.07 (1.42)***  -7.14 (1.37)*** 
Valence -0.26 (0.34)  6.66 (2.38)** 
Arousal -0.25 (0.33)  5.41 (1.88)** 
Valence*Arousal --  -1.03 (0.40)** 
    
Model Information Criteria    
Akaike 15991.15  16645.29 
Bayesian 16018.99  16678.94 
a. Each absolute error value has been increased by one to avoid convergence  
errors within each generalized linear mixed model. 
b. Redundant parameters omitted. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Figure 3.1 
 
 
Note: Sound localization paradigm. The figure on left shows the speaker configuration used in the sound localization paradigm. 
There were eight active speakers (blue) and eight decoy speakers (black) on a horizontal plane elevated three feet. Each speaker 
was three feet away from the participant’s head. The computer running the paradigm software was placed directly in front of the 
participant. The figure on the right shows the computer screen that participants used to identify the location of each sound via a 
computer mouse. The white circle in the center of the screen represents the circle of surrounding speakers. Participants could click 
anywhere on the white circle to identify the perceived location of each sound.    
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Figure 3.2 
 
Note. Pearson and Spearman’s rank-order correlations between sound localization mean absolute error and paranoia or 
neurocognition for each group. Pearson correlation (r) and Spearman’s rank order correlation (rs) are listed in the top right corner of 
each scatterplot. Schizophrenia are on the left and healthy controls are on the right. GPTS = Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale. 
BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia.  
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Figure 3.3 
 
Note: Partial correlation between sound localization and paranoia while accounting  
for paranoia in people with schizophrenia. Scatterplot of residuals derived from simple  
regression analysis of the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS)  
predicting Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS) variance, along with simple  
regression analysis of BACS predicting mean absolute error variance in people with  
schizophrenia (SZ). Plotting these residuals serve as a representation of the partial  
correlation between GPTS and mean absolute error in SZ.
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Figure 3.4 
 
 
Note. Illustration of standardized valence by arousal interaction for sound localization across all participants. 
Interaction plot created to conceptualize the valence/arousal interaction by artificially separating valence into  
pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant categories using the previous cut-offs (pleasant > 5.5; neutral between 4.5  
and 5.5; and unpleasant < 4.5) and preserving arousal as a continuous variable. The plot and generalized  
linear model showed that each one unit increase of valence (more pleasant) resulted in a 1.03 unit decrease  
in the strength of the relationship between arousal and absolute mean error. That is, the effect of arousal on  
absolute mean error decreases as valence becomes more pleasant for both SZ and HC.
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Supplemental Figure 3.1 
 
Note: Group differences in mean individual valence and arousal ratings. Left graph – Higher mean valence ratings for each group 
indicate more unpleasantness. Right graph – Higher mean arousal ratings for each group indicate more excitement. Bars indicate 
group means. There were no significant group differences for mean valence/arousal ratings of auditory environmental stimuli. One 
HC outlier for mean valence was removed (3 standard deviations above the group mean). 
Arousal_All_mean vs. Condition_Dx
Condition_Dx
HC SZ
Ar
ou
sa
l_A
ll_
m
ea
n
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Valence_All_mean vs. Condition_Dx
Condition_Dx
HC SZ
Va
len
ce
_A
ll_
m
ea
n
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
Mea  valence
1
3
5
9
7
HC SZ
Mea  ar usal
1
3
5
9
HC SZ
7
                                                                        
 82 
Supplemental Figure 3.2 
 
Note: Scatterplot of group differences in mean individual valence and arousal ratings. Left scatterplot – Mean valence ratings for 
each IADS stimulus for SZ and HC. Right scatterplot – A total of 10 IADS stimuli with at least one rating (valence or arousal) a full 
point higher between groups.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Study 3. Affective probabilistic reasoning and delusions in schizophrenia 
 
Abstract  
 
Biased probabilistic reasoning may contribute to delusions in schizophrenia. 
Despite threat often being the focus of delusions, its impact on probabilistic reasoning is 
unclear. In this study, 27 people with schizophrenia (SZ) and 24 healthy controls (HC) 
completed neutral and affective versions of a probabilistic reasoning task. Participants 
estimated the probability of neutral (i.e., color beads) or threatening and non-threatening 
(i.e., spies or civilians) sequences of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence coming 
from a likely and unlikely source. Results of linear mixed models with neurocognition as 
covariate showed that SZ were closer to optimal probabilistic reasoning (i.e., Bayes 
inference) than HC when estimating the probability of all evidence (ps < 0.05). When 
estimating the probability of evidence coming from the unlikely source within the 
affective context, SZ were closer to Bayes inference than HC in all conditions except for 
threatening confirmatory evidence (p = 0.01). Estimates closer to Bayes inference in the 
affective (but not neutral) context were associated with greater delusional severity in SZ. 
The findings suggest that probabilistic reasoning is influenced by affective contexts and 
related to symptomatology in SZ. 
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Introduction 
 
 Schizophrenia (SZ) is a chronic mental disorder characterized by delusional 
thinking and severe functional deficits (WHO, 2004) that may stem from a probabilistic 
reasoning style of overestimating and/or underestimating events relative to healthy 
controls (HC; Dudley, Taylor, Wickham, & Hutton, 2016). Delusional thinking may be 
related to a cognitive style of probabilistic reasoning that predisposes an individual to 
gather fewer pieces of evidence and/or disregard counter-evidence needed to challenge 
a belief (e.g., a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias), which could lead to unlikely explanations 
of experiences and the formation of false beliefs (Evans, Averbeck, & Furl, 2015). 
Delusional thinking that is often centered on false beliefs of threat, harm, and 
persecution that may stem from misappraisals of threat (Freeman, 2007). For example, 
a person with schizophrenia may believe that a neighbor walking by their home several 
times indicates this person is spying on them. Yet how SZ reason in the context of 
threat is relatively unknown due to the focus on neutral stimuli or context in probabilistic 
reasoning paradigms. Few studies of SZ have investigated probabilistic reasoning in an 
affective (especially threatening) context. It is possible that perceived threat activates or 
exacerbates reasoning biases due to the need to react to threats. Thus, examination of 
both reasoning and threat could further our understanding of probabilistic reasoning 
may contribute to delusional thinking in SZ.  
Nearly 70% of SZ experience ideas of persecution, suspiciousness, harm, and 
general paranoia (Freeman et al., 2016). This focus on threat may be related to the 
misappraisal of ambiguous social information as threatening, creating a false perception 
of danger (Freeman, 2007). Reasoning biases such as ‘jumping to conclusions’ are 
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thought to protect someone from harm by making a quick decision with few pieces of 
evidence rather than experiencing uncertainty. Thus, it has been suggested that 
probabilistic reasoning biases play a role in delusional formation, as the misperception 
of threat from benign events could be related to an overestimation of- or inappropriate 
assignment of salience to unlikely events  (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 
2013; Roa Romero, Keil, Balz, Gallinat, & Senkowski, 2016). Previous reports have 
shown altered cognitive processes such as enhanced attention and confirmatory bias to 
detect threats in people with a history of delusions (Blackwood, Howard, Bentall, & 
Murray, 2001; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002; Green & Phillips, 
2004). Yet few studies have examined the relationship between threat and probabilistic 
reasoning in SZ. This is largely due to the fact that current probabilistic reasoning 
paradigms typically only involve affectively neutral stimuli.  
For example, a paradigm known as the Beads task is most commonly used in SZ 
research to examine probabilistic reasoning (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; Phillips & 
Edwards, 1966). In the Beads task, participants are free to draw colored beads (e.g., 
blue or red) that seem to come randomly from either a mainly-blue or mainly-red bead 
jar, each with opposite ratios of colored beads (e.g., 85 blue beads and 15 red beads in 
the mainly-blue jar). Participants decide the jar of origin for this seemingly random 
sequence of beads (sequences are predetermined). SZ tend to make fewer draws 
relative to HC and decide on a jar of origin after 1-2 beads are drawn, indicative of the 
jumping to conclusions bias, which may occur in up to 30-40% of SZ (Garety et al., 
2013). However, the findings on the relationship between draws to decision and severity 
of delusions have been mixed. There is evidence that SZ with greater delusional 
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severity make even fewer draws than those with attenuated delusions (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2004), however, evidence also suggests that is no relationship between 
draws to decisions and delusional severity in SZ (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010; 
Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006).  
It should be pointed out that requiring fewer pieces of evidence prior to deciding 
could be considered a more logical probabilistic reasoning style from the Bayesian 
perspective. For instance, using the previous example, if the first bead presented is 
blue, then there is an 85% probability that beads are coming from the mainly-blue jar. 
The first blue bead and any blue beads that follow would be considered confirmatory 
evidence for the hypothesis that the beads come from the mainly-blue jar. If the second 
bead presented is also blue, it would indicate a 97% probability that the beads are 
coming from the mainly blue jar. Thus, even a 3% chance of error is too high for HC to 
feel confident to make a decision. This is in contrast with an 85% probability that the 
beads are coming from the mainly-blue jar instilling enough confidence for some SZ to 
decide after one draw.  
Considering the possible link between fewer bead draws and greater delusional 
severity, an increased data-gathering approach to probabilistic reasoning that is 
characteristic of HC (i.e., drawing well over 1-2 beads) may be more appropriate in 
everyday situations, as underestimating the probability of likely events and 
overestimating the probability of unlikely events relative to optimal Bayes inference, may 
promote data gathering and adjustment of beliefs. This style of probabilistic reasoning 
that is characteristic of HC could be considered “conservative.” Estimates that are 
closer to optimal Bayes inference and more typical of SZ during the Beads task could 
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lead to resolute decisions based on few pieces of evidence. This could be relevant to 
the appraisal of threat within the environment, as quick decisions could have 
advantages in reacting to danger. In addition, a graded estimates version of the Beads 
task provides further insight into probabilistic reasoning, as it has a similar design but 
requires participants to provide an estimate of the likely source of beads after each 
bead presentation. For example, rating a 0 to 100 probability that the beads are coming 
from the mainly-blue jar (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Moritz, Woodward, & Lambert, 
2007). In this version of the task, one study has shown that SZ with severe delusions (n 
= 5) provide higher estimates of the likely source (i.e., near or above Bayes inference) 
than HC (n = 35) or SZ without delusions (n = 25), even after one piece of evidence, 
along with overadjustment (decreased probability estimate that is closer to HC and 
Bayes inference) to a single piece of disconfirmatory evidence relative to HC 
(Speechley, 2010). While the size of severe delusions group in the study is relatively 
small, the findings suggest that estimating closer to- or above Bayes inference, could 
predispose SZ to more severe delusional thinking, as estimates that are near or above 
Bayes inference and less “conservative” than HC could lead to reduced data-gathering 
to challenge a belief, especially in the context of perceived threat. Overadjustment to a 
single piece of disconfirmatory evidence could be indicative of a substantial change in 
the appraisal of threat. For example, a well-known neighbor accidently damages your 
mailbox by backing into it with their car and now becomes a potential threat based on 
this one piece of evidence despite no prior evidence of being a threat (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2005).  
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Yet the Beads task and its current variations may not tap into the threat that often 
accompanies delusional thinking. For instance, an affective version of the Beads task 
substitutes beads for words (e.g., “annoying” or “kind”) drawn from one of two surveys 
containing a mix of negative and positive words that describe the participant (Dudley, 
John, Young, & Over, 1997; Warman, Martin, & Lysaker, 2013). While this version of 
the traditional Beads task does contain a threat to the participant’s self-image, it may 
not evoke a threat of being harmed by others that is characteristic of delusional thinking 
(Freeman, 2007) and has not been adapted as a graded estimates task. Another 
version of a graded estimates task known as the Fish task includes fish drawn one of 
two lakes instead of beads drawn from one of two jars (Speechley, 2010). However, 
such stimuli (i.e., words and fish) may not reflect real world situations involving 
perceived threat in social settings. As such, this may help to explain why a recent meta-
analysis found no correlation with traditional Beads task performance and delusional 
thinking in SZ (Ross, McKay, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2015). A separate meta-analysis 
found only a trend-level association (r = -.09) between number of draws and severity of 
delusions (Dudley et al., 2016).  
Additionally, the Beads, Words, and Fish tasks traditionally ask for probability 
estimates of the likely source (P) only and assume that participants’ estimates for the 
unlikely source would be 1 – P (e.g., if a participant estimates a 60% probability for the 
likely source, a 40% probability estimate for the unlikely source would be assumed). 
However, by obtaining estimates for both possible sources, research has shown less 
“conservative” estimates in SZ with severe delusions compared with HC for the likely 
source but not the unlikely source, along with comparable estimates of unlikely events 
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in SZ with severe delusions and HC (Speechley, 2010). Overall, there is a need for 
probabilistic reasoning paradigms to not only tap into threat, but to also include 
probability estimates of both sources (i.e., likely and unlikely). The findings could help to 
better understand probabilistic reasoning styles that may contribute to the formation and 
maintenance of delusions related to threat in SZ. 
 The current study examined probabilistic reasoning in people with schizophrenia 
and a history of delusional thinking and those with no psychiatric history using neutral 
and affective versions of a graded estimate task. We examined probabilistic reasoning 
by comparing participants’ probability estimates of both the likely and unlikely source 
when presented with neutral or threatening and non-threatening confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory evidence against estimates obtained using the Bayes’ rule. It was 
predicted that SZ would demonstrate a general pattern of estimates closer to Bayes 
inference than HC for both versions of the task (i.e., HC would appear “conservative” 
relative to SZ and Bayes inference via underestimation of likely events and 
overestimation of unlikely events). We explored differences in probability estimates in 
SZ compared with HC differed according to stimuli and evidence type (e.g., confirmatory 
spies versus disconfirmatory civilians) for likely and unlikely sources. Within SZ, it was 
predicted that there would be a significant relationship between probabilistic reasoning 
closer to- or above Bayes inference and more severe delusional thinking for the 
affective version of the task only.          
 
Methods 
 
 Participants 
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Participants were recruited from University of Michigan Department of Psychiatry 
and Psychology research registries (N = 51). Inclusion/exclusion criteria for healthy 
control participants (n = 24) included no history of: 1) a Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) Axis 1 
disorder according to the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997), 2) immediate family members with a psychotic or 
bipolar disorder, and 3) a major medical condition that may impact cognitive function 
(e.g., traumatic brain injury or seizures). A total of 27 patient participants had a DSM-IV 
diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and history of delusional thinking 
confirmed by SCID-IV. Patient participants did not have a history of substance abuse or 
dependence within the last five years.  
Procedure 
Participants were assessed with the SCID-P or SCID-NP administered by a 
clinical psychology doctoral student. All participants completed the Brief Assessment of 
Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS; Keefe, 1999) as a measure of general cognition. 
Severity of delusional thinking in SZ was determined with the delusions subscale of the 
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984). Participants 
then completed the graded estimates probabilistic reasoning tasks. Participants also 
completed similar tasks adapted for the event-related brain potential (ERP) technique in 
a later session. The ERP results are not reported here. The study protocol was 
approved by the University of Michigan Institutional Research Board. All participants 
provided informed consent prior to enrolling in the study. 
Graded Estimates Tasks  
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Participants were seated in front of a Windows desktop computer and randomly 
assigned to first complete either a neutral or affective version of a graded estimates 
task. The task required participants to determine how likely it was that a sequence of 
stimuli was coming from one of two sources. For the neutral version of the task, 
participants were told that there are two jars, each with 100 beads. One jar contains 60 
orange beads and 40 violet beads while the other contains 40 orange beads and 60 
violet beads; the beads are randomly dispersed within the jars. A 60/40 ratio was 
chosen since SZ typically have fewer draws to a decision in a Beads task with a 60/40 
ratio compared with the more common 85/15 ratio (Ross et al., 2015). Participants were 
then told that one of the jars has been chosen at random and a series of beads will be 
shown from this chosen jar. These beads always come from the chosen jar and are 
replaced after being drawn so that the proportion of beads in both jars stays the same. 
Participants rated the probability on a continuous scale of 0 to 10 that the series of 
beads came from the mainly-orange jar (i.e., 0 = very unlikely and 10 = very likely). 
Using an identical scale, participants also rated the probability that the series of beads 
came from the mainly-violet jar. Participants used a computer mouse to indicate their 
estimate on the two scales (i.e., participants could click anywhere on the scales to make 
their ratings). Thus, the current paradigm does not assume that estimates of each jar 
sum up to 10. In other words, an estimate of 6/10 or 60% probability for the mainly-
orange jar does not necessarily mean an expected estimate of 40% probability for the 
violet jar; a participant could estimate 60% for the mainly-orange jar and 50% for the 
mainly-violet jar. This allows for further examination of probabilistic reasoning that is 
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free of assumed complementary estimates for likely and unlikely sources. MATLAB 
software (MathWorks, Inc.) was used to run the paradigm. 
Each trial began with the presentation of an orange or purple bead. Participants 
then provided an estimate that the current bead comes from the mainly-orange jar and 
then an estimate that current bead comes from the mainly-violet jar. There was no time 
limit. Immediately after providing these estimates, a second bead appeared, and the 
previous bead was placed near the top of the computer screen to serve as a reminder 
of the previously drawn beads. Participants then provided an estimate that the two 
beads came from the mainly-orange jar and then an estimate that the two beads came 
from the mainly-violet jar. This procedure continued until ten beads were shown and 
then a new sequence of beads began. See Supplemental Figure 1 for a screenshot of 
the task. A total of six predetermined sequences were presented once in a random 
order:  
(1A) O O O O O O O O O O (ten orange beads)  
(1B) V V V V V V V V V V (ten violet beads)  
(2A) O O O O V O O O O V (eight orange and two violet beads) 
(2B) V V V V O V V V V O (eight violet and two orange beads) 
(3A) O O V O O O O V O O (eight orange and two violet beads) 
(3B) V V O V V V V O V V (eight violet and two orange beads)  
Each of the three kinds of sequences (i.e., 1, 2, and 3) were counterbalanced for 
the different stimuli (i.e., orange or violet beads). That is, A and B had the same pattern 
but swapped bead colors. All sequences were designed so that one of the jars is more 
likely than the other. For example, Sequence 1A included only orange beads, firmly 
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establishing a hypothesis that the beads are coming from the mainly-orange jar. 
According to Bayes theorem, which provides a mathematical calculation to determine 
optimal probabilistic reasoning via adjustment of prior knowledge or predictions based 
on new or current evidence (Bayes, 1763; Hemsley & Garety, 1986; Laplace, 1902), 
there is a 60% probability for the likely source being the mainly-orange jar at the 
presentation of the first bead in Sequence 1A. This probability increases to 98.3% by 
the presentation of the tenth consecutive orange bead. Sequences 1A and 1B allow for 
a better understanding of how HC and SZ reason in the context of mounting 
confirmatory evidence for the hypothesis. Sequences 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B were 
designed to establish a clear hypothesis for the likely stimuli source despite occasional 
disconfirmatory evidence. For example, in Sequence 2A the first bead is orange, which 
provided support for the hypothesis that beads come from the mainly-orange jar. The 
first orange bead is then followed by three consecutive orange beads that provided 
more support for this hypothesis (83.5% probability at that point). The first presentation 
of a violet and thus disconfirmatory piece of evidence only reduced the probability of the 
series of beads came from the mainly-orange jar to 77.1%, and the presentation of four 
additional and consecutive beads increased this probability to 94.5% before the final 
bead, which was violet and disconfirmatory, only reducing the probability of the series of 
beads came from the mainly-orange jar to 91.9%. Further, Sequences 2A, 2B, 3A, and 
3B were designed to include two pieces of disconfirmatory evidence at seemingly 
random points, but always with the presentation of at least two pieces of confirmatory 
evidence prior to disconfirmatory. These four sequences allowed for a better 
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understanding of probabilistic reasoning in the context of mixed evidence while still 
establishing a favored hypothesis for the likely source of stimuli.   
For the affective version of the task, beads and jars were replaced by 
spies/civilians and buildings, respectively. The stimuli were obtained from the AR Face 
Database and used with the owner’s permission (Martinez & Benavente, 1998). 
Participants were told that that are two buildings, each with 100 people inside. One 
building contained 60 spies and 40 civilians while the other building contained 40 spies 
and 60 civilians. To distinguish between spies and civilians, spies always wore 
sunglasses and civilians never wore sunglasses. All spies/civilians were Caucasian 
males to reduce a possible effect of race and sex. Participants were told that spies may 
be spying on them and that civilians were never spying on them. The instructions were 
identical to the neutral version of the task, with participants determining the probability 
of people, either spies or civilians, coming from a building with mainly spies (60 spies 
and 40 civilians) and a building with mainly civilians (60 civilians and 40 spies). See 
Supplemental Figure 2 for a depiction of the task. The sequences used in the affective 
version of the task were the same as the neutral version of the task: 
(1A) S S S S S S S S S S  (ten spies) 
(1B) C C C C C C C C C C  (ten civilians) 
(2A) S S S S C S S S S C   (eight spies and two civilians) 
(2B) C C C C S C C C C S  (eight civilians and two spies) 
(2C) S S C S S S S C S S   (eight spies and two civilians) 
(2D) C C S C C C C S C C  (eight spies and two civilians) 
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To ensure participants understood the task instructions, a practice session 
consisting of one sequence of ten random beads (orange or violet) or spies/civilians 
was completed prior to the actual tasks. For example, stimuli in the practice session 
were comprised of beads if the participant was randomly selected to complete the 
beads version of the task first; practice session stimuli were spies/civilians if the 
participant was randomly selected to complete the affective version first.     
Data aggregation for graded estimate tasks 
To determine the deviation of estimates from optimal Bayes inference in both 
versions of the task, each of the 20 estimates in every sequence (i.e., ten for the likely 
source and ten for the unlikely source) were first multiplied by ten (i.e., an estimate of 
7.5 becomes 75). Bayes theorem calculation was then subtracted from the 
corresponding probability, resulting in an ‘estimate deviation’ from Bayes inference. For 
example, if a participant’s sequence of estimates for the likely source in Sequence 1A is 
65, 68, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100, 100, and 100, these estimates were subtracted from 
corresponding Bayes theorem calculations of 60, 69.2, 77.1, 83.5, 88.4, 91.9, 94.5, 
96.2, 97.5, and 98.3, respectively. Thus, estimate deviation with a positive value 
indicates overestimation (e.g., 65 – 60 = 5) and an estimate deviation with a negative 
value indicates underestimation relative to Bayes inference (e.g., 68 – 69.2 = -1.2). 
Estimate deviation was calculated according to variables of interest (e.g., confirmatory 
and disconfirmatory evidence types) to run separate LMM for estimate deviation of likely 
and unlikely sources in the neutral and then affective versions of the task. 
For the neutral version, estimate deviations for the likely source of Sequence 1A 
was averaged across the ten trials since all stimuli were confirmatory pieces of evidence 
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(i.e., continuing with the previous example, the average of 5, -1.2, -2.1, -3.5, -3.4, -1.9, 
0.5, 3.8, 2.5, and 1.7 results in an estimate deviation of 0.14 for the likely source of 
Sequence 1A). This was repeated for the unlikely source of Sequence 1A. Since the 
sequence of beads was identical for Sequence 1A and 1B, and bead color (i.e., orange 
or violet) was not a variable of interest, Sequence 1A and 1B were averaged together 
for the likely source and then the unlikely source and referred to as the neutral 
Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence, with an average estimate deviation for the likely 
source and an average estimate deviation for the unlikely source. For the ten trials 
within neutral Sequence 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B, estimate deviations for the eight 
confirmatory and two disconfirmatory stimuli were averaged. All four sequences were 
then averaged for both the likely and unlikely source due to bead color or order of 
disconfirmatory evidence not being variables of interest. These combined sequences 
are referred to as the neutral Mixed Sequence. After all averages were calculated for 
neutral Consistently-Confirmatory and Mixed Sequences, there were six estimate 
deviations for each participant. 
For the affective version of the task, calculation of estimate deviation was similar 
to the neutral version of the task, except that in this version of the task stimuli type (spy 
or civilian) was a variable of interest. Thus, the ten estimates for the likely building in 
affective Sequence 1A were averaged separately from those for the likely building in 
Sequence 1B. The same was done for the unlikely building in Sequence 1A and then 
Sequence 1B. Affective Sequences 1A and 1B were referred to as the affective 
Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence. Since affective Sequences 2A and 3A include the 
mainly spy building as likely, the estimates in these sequences were averaged together 
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according to confirmatory (spies) and disconfirmatory evidence type for the likely 
building. The same was done for the unlikely building in Sequences 2A and 3A. 
Affective Sequences 2B and 3B include the mainly civilian building as likely and 
estimates in these sequences were also averaged together and according to evidence 
type. The same was done for the unlikely building in Sequences 2B and 3B. Affective 
Sequences 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B were referred to as the affective Mixed Sequence. After 
all averages were calculated for affective Consistently-Confirmatory and Mixed 
Sequences, there were 12 estimate deviations for each participant. 
Data Analysis   
Simple t-tests or chi-square were used to determine group differences in 
demographics and self-report measures (Table 1).  
For the graded estimates tasks, data for two SZ participants were removed due 
to random performance reported by the participants and observed by the study team 
during the tasks. In addition, estimate outliers (three standard deviations from the mean) 
were removed from analyses (~1% of data). The Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence 
was examined separately from the Mixed Sequence due to the different research 
questions they answer (i.e., Sequence 1 examines probability in the absence of 
disconfirmatory evidence and Sequence 2 includes both confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory evidence). Due to collinearity between likely and unlikely sources, the 
likely and unlikely source was examined separately. Neurocognition (e.g., working 
memory) has been associated with probabilistic reasoning in SZ (Batty et al., 2016; 
Garety et al., 2013; Menon et al., 2006) and was included as a covariate in all analyses 
of estimate deviation group differences. Since a random and/or repeated factor was not 
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available for the neutral version of the Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence, a one-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine group differences in the 
estimate deviation of the likely and unlikely jars while accounting for neurocognitive 
covariance, resulting in two one-way ANCOVAs. All other sequences were examined 
with linear mixed models (LMM) predicting variance of estimate deviation for the likely 
and unlikely source (jars or buildings) in the Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence 
(affective version) and the Mixed Sequence (neutral and affective versions), resulting in 
six models. LMM included a random intercept for participant ID and repeated effect(s) 
for evidence type (and stimuli type for the affective version only). In comparison to 
traditional repeated-measures ANOVA, LMM help reduce the risk of Type I errors by 
selecting the simplest model with the best fit to the data rather than the ANOVA 
approach of examining all possible main effects and interactions without correction for 
multiple comparisons (Demidenko, 2013). Separate LMM were created for the likely and 
unlikely sources due to collinearity. 
The one-way ANCOVA used for likely jar of the neutral Consistently-Confirmatory 
Sequence included group (HC or SZ) as a fixed effect and estimate deviation as the 
dependent variable. This ANCOVA model was repeated for the unlikely jar of the neutral 
Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence. The first LMM for the likely jar of the neutral 
Mixed Sequence included group and evidence type (confirmatory or disconfirmatory) as 
fixed effects, BACS as covariate, and evidence type as the repeated measure. This 
model was repeated for the unlikely jar of the neutral Mixed Sequence. The first LMM 
for the likely building of the affective Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence included 
group and stimuli (spy or civilian) as fixed effects, BACS as a covariate, and stimuli as 
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the repeated measure. This model was repeated for the unlikely building of the affective 
Mixed Sequence. The first LMM for the likely building of the affective Mixed Sequence 
was identical to the LMM of the affective Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence except 
that evidence type was added as a fixed effect and repeated measure. This LMM was 
repeated for the unlikely building of the affective Mixed Sequence. LMM convergence 
errors were observed due to collinearity between confirmatory and disconfirmatory 
evidence, along with spies and civilians for the affective version. Since this violates an 
assumption of LMM, convergence errors were resolved by removing the repeated 
factor(s) from the final model. Accordingly, all models were compared with and without 
the repeated factor(s) and the final winning model was selected based on the 
information criterion (-2 REML log-likelihood, AIC, and BIC). Within each ANCOVA or 
LMM, main effects were included first, followed by two-way interactions, and then 
higher-order interactions. Only significant interactions were included in the final model 
(i.e., all nonsignificant interactions were removed) and interaction contrast was used for 
post-hoc analysis of significant higher-order interactions.   
Pearson and Spearman’s rank-order correlations were used to determine 
relationships between SAPS delusions and mean estimate deviation of Consistently-
Confirmatory and Mixed Sequences (neutral and affective versions), along with 
significant main effects and/or interactions of estimate deviations derived from LMM 
(e.g., confirmatory civilians). 
Results 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of probability estimates between SZ and HC for all 
sequences. ANCOVA and LMM showed a significant group difference in estimate 
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deviation for neutral and affective likely and unlikely sources in both neutral and 
affective task versions of the Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence (i.e., only 
confirmatory evidence), along with BACS being a significant covariate in all models 
(Table 2). Specifically, relative to Bayes inference, HC underestimated probabilities for 
likely events and overestimated probabilities for unlikely events, while SZ had a similar 
but weaker pattern of probability estimates (i.e., HC were provided “conservative” 
estimates relative to SZ and Bayes inference).  
LMM showed that for the likely and unlikely jars and buildings in the Mixed 
Sequence, there was also a similar significant group difference, along with BACS as a 
significant covariate. For the unlikely jar in the neutral Mixed Sequence, along with likely 
and unlikely buildings in the affective Mixed Sequence, there was a significant 
interaction between evidence type and BACS (Table 3). Across participants, poorer 
BACS was associated with increased estimates for unlikely events in the neutral and 
affective Mixed Sequences and decreased estimates for likely events in the affective 
Mixed Sequence, and this relationship was accentuated for disconfirmatory compared 
with confirmatory evidence (Figure 2). For the unlikely building in the affective Mixed 
Sequence, there was a significant three-way interaction between group, evidence type, 
and stimuli (Figure 3). Interaction contrast showed that SZ and HC provided similar 
ratings for confirmatory evidence when threatening (i.e., spy) in comparison to all other 
evidence/stimuli types combined, t(122.2) = -2.58, p = 0.011).   
Figure 3 also shows the significant Pearson and Spearman’s rank order 
correlations between estimate deviation related to the LMM interaction identified in the 
affective Mixed Sequence (Group x Stimuli x Evidence) and SAPS Delusions in SZ. 
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There was a significant positive Pearson and Spearman’s rank order correlation 
between SAPS delusions and estimate deviation of confirmatory spies, along with the 
average estimate deviation of the three evidence type/stimuli combined (i.e., 
confirmatory civilians; disconfirmatory spies and civilians). There was also a positive 
Pearson and Spearman’s rank order correlation between SAPS delusions and mean 
estimate deviation for the likely and unlikely buildings in the affective Mixed Sequence 
but not the likely and unlikely jars in the neutral Mixed Sequence (Figure 4). In all 
correlations, greater delusional severity was related to overestimation of likely events 
and underestimation of unlikely events. There were no significant correlations between 
SAPS Delusions and the neutral or affective Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence 
estimate deviations in SZ (p’s > 0.05; Supplemental Table 1). 
Discussion 
The current study examined probabilistic reasoning in people with schizophrenia 
and those with no history of mental illness using neutral and affective versions of a 
graded estimates task in which participants estimated the probability of neutral (i.e., 
color beads) or threatening and non-threatening (i.e., spies or civilians) sequences of 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence coming from a likely and unlikely source. It 
was found that in both task versions, SZ estimated closer to optimal or accurate 
probabilistic reasoning (i.e., Bayes inference) than HC. This pattern of estimation for HC 
could be described as “conservative” relative to SZ and Bayes inference. However, 
there was one exception to this finding, SZ was not significantly different from HC when 
estimating the probability that a sequence of affective evidence was coming from an 
unlikely source for all combinations of evidence and stimuli (e.g., confirmatory civilians) 
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except for the condition when confirmatory evidence was threatening (i.e., spies). That 
is, all participants had less “conservative” estimates for evidence that confirmed spies 
were not coming from an improbable source. In addition, poorer neurocognition was 
associated with a conservative style of probabilistic reasoning across all participants, 
especially for disconfirmatory compared with confirmatory evidence. Within SZ, a less 
conservative style of probabilistic reasoning was related to greater severity of delusional 
thinking. 
While most people do not explicitly use Bayes inference in everyday situations 
that require probability, as evidenced by the conservative pattern of probability relative 
to Bayes inference in the current study and previous reports (Evans, 1989; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983), the current findings provide 
support for Freeman’s cognitive model of delusions in which estimates closer to Bayes 
or extreme initial estimates may predispose individuals to ‘jump to conclusions’ while 
conservative estimates (i.e., underestimation of likely events and overestimation of 
unlikely events) may protect individuals from jumping to conclusions that are false or 
delusional (Dudley & Over, 2003). That is, healthy individuals may be more skeptical of 
the likelihood of events relative to SZ and thus ‘hold conclusions’ prior to forming 
beliefs. Considering that Freeman’s model can be used to understand the formation of 
delusions in clinical settings (Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis; Fowler, 
Garety, & Kuipers, 1995), the current findings provide support for the psychosocial 
treatment of biases probabilistic reasoning in SZ such as jumping to conclusions. 
Freeman’s model also identifies affect as contributing to the formation of 
delusions (e.g., anxiety may heighten anticipation of danger and promote a jumping to 
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conclusions bias). The current study provides additional support for Freeman’s model of 
delusions with the finding of HC estimating closer to SZ and Bayes inference for 
affective evidence that confirmed threatening evidence (i.e., spies) were not coming 
from an improbable source. Otherwise, HC provided conservative estimates for 
confirmatory civilians and disconfirmatory civilians or spies relative to SZ and Bayes 
inference. For HC, this may underscore the influence of threat on probabilistic reasoning 
within an affective context, as spy stimuli may tap into threats relevant to the current era 
of government surveillance (NSA phone monitoring; Rainie & Madden, 2015) and 
promote a style of probabilistic reasoning that is characteristic of SZ. 
A more comprehensive model of delusional formation has been proposed by 
Adams, Stephan, Brown, Frith, and Friston (2013) in which delusional thinking is the 
result of aberrant precision or confidence of beliefs. Adams and colleagues posit that a 
belief can be held with varying levels of precision or confidence. A belief held prior to 
observing evidence is a prior belief and is updated as the posterior belief after the 
observation of evidence (i.e., combination of prior beliefs with sensory evidence). 
Precision errors may stem from neuromodulatory dysconnections at the synaptic level, 
primarily in the prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe (e.g., abnormal 
neuromodulation of superficial pyramidal cells). Yet this theory does not fully address 
the contribution of affect to the process of belief and sensory evidence precision, as the 
current study found that an affective context influences probabilistic reasoning for those 
with no history of mental illness. 
Among all participants, poorer neurocognition was related to increased 
probability estimates of unlikely events and decreased probability estimates of likely 
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events, and this relationship was stronger for disconfirmatory compared with 
confirmatory evidence. This finding may seem to contradict the previous finding of group 
differences in estimate deviation, as HC but not SZ tended to demonstrate the 
previously described pattern of estimation, yet SZ have poorer neurocognition than HC. 
However, the intercept difference of the regression line between SZ and HC, along with 
the range of estimate deviations and BACS observed in Supplemental Figure 3, help to 
explain this finding. Supplemental Figure 3 shows that HC estimated closer to Bayes 
inference as BACS improved while SZ estimated farther from Bayes as BACS improved 
or worsened, with no interaction between group and BACS. It is necessary to note that 
the intercept value is generally farther from Bayes inference for HC but closer to Bayes 
inference for SZ. HC typically overestimated unlikely events and underestimated likely 
events compared with SZ (i.e., HC were more “conservative” relative to SZ and Bayes 
inference), the conservative pattern decreased as BACS improved for HC and thus 
brought HC closer to Bayes inference. But for SZ, since they typically estimated closer 
to Bayes inference, improved BACS moved SZ farther from Bayes inference via 
underestimation of unlikely events and overestimation of likely events. Thus, it would be 
inaccurate to conclude that those with higher neurocognition estimate closer to Bayes 
inference, instead this finding suggests that those with higher neurocognition tend to 
use a less conservative reasoning style compared with those with lower neurocognition, 
especially for disconfirmatory compared with confirmatory evidence. That is, an unlikely 
event becomes more likely and a likely event becomes even less likely after the 
presentation of disconfirmatory compared with confirmatory evidence for those with 
poorer neurocognition. It is possible that poorer working memory could impact the ability 
  105 
to recall previous estimates and lead to an emphasis on current evidence, resulting in 
an unlikely event becoming more likely and a likely event becoming less likely when 
presented with disconfirmatory evidence. However, previous studies have reported 
mixed results regarding the relationship between neurocognition and probabilistic 
reasoning in SZ using the traditional Beads task. While poorer neurocognition has been 
associated with a reduced draws to decision or heightened ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias 
in SZ (Garety et al., 2013), it has also been associated with more draws to decision in 
SZ (Batty et al., 2016). Few studies (if any), have examined the relationship between 
graded estimates and neurocognition. As current evidence remains inconclusive, future 
probabilistic reasoning studies in SZ would benefit from analysis of neurocognition and 
evidence types to better understand this relationship. 
Decreased probability estimates of unlikely events and increased estimates of 
likely events were related to more severe delusional thinking in SZ, and not just for 
confirmatory spies, but affective sequences in general. The positive correlations 
observed between less “conservative” probability estimates of affective but not neutral 
evidence and more severe delusional thinking in SZ appear to support Freeman’s 
inclusion of affect into his model of delusional formation. It is possible that the 
fear/anxiety elicited by threat need to quickly respond to a possible threat within the 
environment promotes a need to respond quickly and a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias 
that could lead to false beliefs (Freeman, 2007). Previous reports have observed a 
heightened jumping to conclusions bias in SZ using self-referent words that may 
threaten self-image in place of beads during the traditional Beads task (Dudley et al., 
1997), suggesting that affective stimuli or contexts with some type of threat promote 
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higher probability estimates of likely events and lower probability estimates of unlikely 
events. Considering the observed relationship with delusional thinking in SZ and 
probability estimates of affective stimuli only, the current findings suggest that the weak 
or nonsignificant relationship between delusional severity and draws to decisions in the 
Beads task reported in meta-analyses (Dudley et al., 2016; Ross et al., 2015) may be 
explained by the use of neutral rather affective stimuli. It is possible that benign stimuli 
within an affective context may be perceived as threatening (e.g., civilians could be 
misinterpreted as spies), similar to the aberrant salience model of psychosis (Morrison 
& Murray, 2009).  
The current findings do not replicate all findings from Speechley (2010), one of 
the only other SZ studies to use a probabilistic reasoning task with estimates for the 
likely and unlikely source of evidence. Speechley (2010) reported that SZ with severe 
delusions had similar estimates to HC for unlikely events but higher estimates than HC 
for likely events (i.e., overestimation for both events relative to Bayes inference), and SZ 
without delusions estimated similar to HC for both sources. In this study, SZ estimated 
significantly closer to Bayes inference than HC for both the likely and unlikely source of 
evidence. It is possible that differences in task design contributed to this discrepancy. 
Speechley (2010) used unique ratios for most sources (e.g., 80 black fish / 20 white fish 
for the likely source and 50 black fish / 50 white fish for the unlikely source) compared 
with the current study, which used inverse ratios for the likely and unlikely sources (i.e., 
60/40 for the likely source and 40/60 for the unlikely source). Further, Speechley (2010) 
had participants view the sources without being told the ratio of fish for each source. 
Both factors could have impacted probability estimates for the unlikely source in 
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comparison to the current study, especially when considering the ambiguity that could 
arise with a 50/50 source option. That is, participants may have found it difficult to 
consider a 50/50 source option as unlikely. We also did not observe overadjustment in 
probability estimates for a single piece of disconfirmatory evidence in SZ relative to HC. 
This could be explained by differences between study samples, as the current sample 
had relatively low levels of delusional severity compared with those with severe 
delusions reported in Speechley (2010), inpatient participants reported in Garety, 
Hemsley, and Wessely (1991), or a majority of participants with active or severe 
delusions reported in Langdon, Ward, and Coltheart (2010). It is possible that SZ with 
more severe symptomatology demonstrate a cognitive style of probabilistic reasoning 
that emphasizes a single piece of current evidence rather than the accumulation of 
evidence, resulting in overadjustment.  
Limitations 
 The current study is limited by a relatively small sample size, along with a limited 
range of delusional severity in patients. Speechley (2010) found that only SZ with 
currently severe delusional thinking exhibited hypersalience to evidence hypothesis 
matches, however, the small sample of those with severe self-reported delusional 
thinking raises questions about the generalizability of the finding (n = 5). The current 
study may have benefited from the addition of a decision point to the paradigm, which 
would have allowed for a JTC determination (i.e., draws to decision) to compliment 
probability estimates. It is possible that those who are more prone to JTC (i.e., 1-2 
draws to decision) have a stronger relationship between probability estimates and 
delusional thinking within the context of hypersalient evidence-hypothesis matches. 
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However, there are also methodological issues concerning the current paradigm used to 
index probabilistic reasoning (i.e., the traditional Beads Task and its modified versions) 
that includes participants’ miscomprehension of the task ‘(e.g., participants doubt the 
evidence is coming from one source). A recently developed and methodologically sound 
alternative to the Beads task is the Box task, which may benefit from adaption with 
affective stimuli (Moritz et al., 2017). Further, the effects of reward, punishment, 
psychological stress, or time constraints were not evaluated in the current study. All of 
these factors could impact probabilistic reasoning, even more so within the current 
affective paradigm. In addition, it is unknown if the current stimuli elicit threat due to the 
absence of participant ratings of elicited threat for the stimuli (e.g., 0 to 100). Overall, 
future probabilistic reasoning studies would do well to examine a large sample with a 
wide range of both self-reported and clinically assessed delusional severity using a 
similar graded estimates task with decision points and threat ratings, along with 
affective adaptions of the more methodologically sound Box task. 
 Conclusions 
 The current findings indicate that probabilistic reasoning in SZ is closer to optimal 
probabilistic reasoning (i.e., Bayes inference) than HC after accounting for 
neurocognition in both neutral and affective contexts. That is, HC underestimate likely 
events and overestimate unlikely events, a pattern that could be considered 
“conservative” relative to SZ and Bayes inference. Within the affective context, there 
were no differences in the estimate deviation from Bayes inference between SZ and HC 
when estimating the probability of confirmatory threatening evidence coming from an 
unlikely source, but otherwise SZ estimated closer to Bayes inference than HC for all 
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other conditions of affective evidence coming from an unlikely source. A less 
“conservative” pattern of probability estimates was related to severe delusional thinking 
in SZ for affective stimuli (i.e., spies and civilians) but not neutral stimuli (i.e., beads). 
Thus, a pattern of probabilistic reasoning in SZ that is closer to Bayes inference and 
less “conservative” than HC may be influenced by affective contexts and related to 
delusional thinking in SZ.  
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Table 4.1: Demographic and clinical characteristics of HC and SZ participants 
  Scale 
Range 
 HC (n=24)  SZ (n=25)  t/chi-
square 
Age (years)    43.0 (15.0)  43.7 (13.7)  0.18 
Sex (Male/Female)    12/12  12/13  0.02 
Level of education  1-8  6.3 (1.6)  5.1 (1.6)  -2.58* 
BACS    0.0 (1.0)  -0.6 (0.8)  -2.22* 
BDI-IA  0-63  0.8 (1.6)  8.8 (6.4)  5.98*** 
STAI-S  20-80  26.2 (4.1)  37.6 (10.2)  5.07*** 
SAPS Total  0-20  --  5.1 (3.4)   
    SAPS Delusions  0-5  --  2.0 (1.3)   
SANS  0-20  --  5.6 (2.8)   
Daily CPZ equivalent (n=16)    --  527.8 (834.8)   
Duration of Illness (years)    --  27.6 (13.5)   
Hospitalizations    --  5.3 (6.0)   
Note. SZ = schizophrenia. HC = healthy control. Level of education is comprised of eight levels: 
1) grade 6 or less, 2) grade 12 but did not graduate, 3) high school diploma or equivalent, 4) 
part college, 5) associate’s degree, 6) bachelor’s degree, 7) part graduate or professional 
school, 8) graduate or professional school degree. BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in 
Schizophrenia z-score. BDI-IA = revised version of the Beck Depression Inventory. STAI-S = 
state subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. SAPS Total = Scale for the Assessment of 
Positive Symptoms total score. SAPS Delusions = delusions subscale of the Scale for the 
Assessment of Positive Symptoms. SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms. 
CPZ = chlorpromazine (dosage unavailable for eight patients). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 
0.001. 
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Table 4.2: ANCOVA and LMM for Estimate Deviation from Bayes Calculation for the Neutral and Affective Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence 
 A Neutral Consistently-Confirmatory 
Sequencea 
 
B Affective Consistently-Confirmatory 
Sequenceb 
  Likely Jar Unlikely Jar  Likely Building Unlikely Buildingc 
Tests of Fixed Effects       
    Intercept  F(1, 46.0) = 12.25** F(1, 46.0) = 23.9***  F(1, 46.6) = 8.37** F(1, 46.0) = 15.18*** 
    Group (HC, SZ)  F(1, 46.0) = 8.87** F(1, 46.0) = 9.89**  F(1, 46.0) = 15.33*** F(1, 46.0) = 11.54** 
    BACS  F(1, 46.0) = 10.58** F(1, 46.0) = 17.73***  F(1, 46.0) = 24.66*** F(1, 46.0) = 25.53*** 
    Stimuli (Spy, Civilian)  -- --  F(1, 48.0) = 2.25 F(1, 48.0) = 1.42 
       
Estimates of Fixed Effectsd  b (s.e.) b (s.e.)  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 
    Intercept  -0.85 (2.39) 2.96 (2.49)  0.81 (2.36) 1.44 (2.56) 
    HC  -9.71 (3.26)** 10.67 (3.39)**  -11.91 (3.04)*** 11.61 (3.42)** 
    BACS  5.73 (1.76)** -7.72 (1.83)***  8.15 (1.64)*** 9.33 (1.85)*** 
    Spy  -- --  1.24 (0.83) -1.17 (0.98) 
       
Model Information Criteria       
    -2 REML log-likelihood  359.9 363.6  662.3 689.2 
    AIC  361.9 365.6  668.3 693.2 
    BIC  363.7 367.4  675.9 698.2 
a. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) 
b. Linear Mixed Model (LMM) 
c. Repeated effects (evidence type and stimuli type) removed due to convergence error 
d. Redundant parameters omitted 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 4.3: LMM for Estimate Deviation from Bayes Calculation for the Neutral and Affective Mixed Sequence 
  Neutral Mixed Sequencea 
 
 Affective Mixed Sequence 
 A Likely Jar Unlikely Jar B Likely Building Unlikely Building 
Tests of Fixed Effects       
    Intercept  F(1, 44.9) = 7.75** F(1, 45.0) = 15.71***  F(1, 53.0) = 8.08** F(1, 50.6) = 12.66** 
    Group (HC, SZ)  F(1, 44.9) = 7.04* F(1, 44.9) = 6.43*  F(1, 45.7) = 11.2** F(1, 50.6) = 8.11** 
    BACS  F(1, 45.2) = 11.74** F(1, 45.0) = 22.94***  F(1, 52.7) = 13.9***  F(1, 50.3) = 17.9*** 
    Evidence (Confirmatory, Disconfirmatory)  F(1, 46.4) = 2.94 F(1, 44.4) = 0.09  F(1, 98.9) = 3.38 F(1, 99.7) = 0.25 
    Evidence x BACS  -- F(1, 44.6) = 8.97**  F(1, 97.0) = 6.21* F(1, 87.7) = 10.09** 
    Stimuli (Spy, Civilian)  -- --  F(1, 54.9) = 2.22 F(1, 96.3) = 0.35 
    Evidence x Stimuli x Group  -- --  -- F(1, 59.5) = 2.57* 
       
Estimates of Fixed Effectb  b (s.e.) b (s.e.)  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 
    Intercept  -1.46 (2.6) 2.64 (2.6)  -0.93 (2.65) -0.04 (3.08) 
    HC  -9.0 (3.39)* 8.72 (3.44)*  -10.98 (3.28)** 10.99 (4.22)* 
    BACS  6.3 (1.84)** -10.85 (1.98)***  8.38 (2.09)*** -9.64 (2.07)*** 
    Confirmatory  2.48 (1.44) -0.37 (1.26)  2.14 (1.17) 1.42 (2.06) 
    Confirmatory, BACS  -- 3.91 (1.3)**  -3.04 (1.22)* 3.16 (1.0)** 
    Spy  -- --  1.0 (0.67) 1.96 (2.37) 
    Spy, Confirmatory, HC  -- --  -- -5.07 (4.36) 
    Spy, Confirmatory, SZ  -- --  -- -1.57 (2.59) 
    Spy, Disconfirmatory, HC  -- --  -- 0.41 (3.36) 
    Civilian, Confirmatory, HC  -- --  -- -0.57 (2.88) 
       
Model Information Criteria       
    -2 REML log-likelihood  717.6 690.4  1375.6 1299.2 
    AIC  721.6 694.4  1385.6 1309.2 
    BIC  726.7 699.5  1401.8 1325.1 
a. Sequence was analyzed without repeated effects due to smaller model information criteria values for the model without repeated effects 
compared with the model with repeated effects. 
b. Redundant parameters omitted. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Supplemental Table 4.1: Pearson Correlations Between  
SAPS Delusions and Estimate Deviations for the Neutral  
and Affective Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence 
 SAPS Delusions 
SZ (n = 25)  
Sequence 1 Likely Jar 0.23 
Sequence 1 Unlikely Jar -0.19 
Sequence 1 Likely Building 0.24 
Sequence 1 Unlikely Building -0.17 
Note. SZ = schizophrenia. HC = healthy control.  
SAPS delusions = Delusions subscale of the Scale  
for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. Analyses  
were repeated with Spearman’s rank order correlation  
and found to be nearly identical.
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Figure 4.1 
 
 
Note: Raw probability estimates for each sequence and group. HC = healthy control. SZ = schizophrenia. Sequence 1A reversed the 
likely jar compared with Sequence 1B (e.g., mainly-orange jar is likely in Sequence 1A and mainly-purple jar is likely in Sequence 
1B). Sequences 1A and 1B were averaged together and referred to as the neutral or affective Consistently-Confirmatory Sequence. 
Disconfirmatory evidence within sequences 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B is designated by the stimulus number being underlined. Sequences 
2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B are referred to as the neutral or affective Mixed Sequence.
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Figure 4.2 
 
 
Note: Two-way interaction between evidence type and neurocognition for estimate deviation across all participants. Evidence type = 
confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Estimate deviation is included for: 1) the unlikely jar of the neutral Mixed Sequence, 2) the likely 
building of the affective Mixed Sequence, and 3) the unlikely building of the affective Mixed Sequence. BACS = Brief Assessment of 
Cognition in Schizophrenia. Estimate deviation was calculated by subtracting the participant’s probability estimates from Bayes 
calculation.
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Figure 4.3  
                                   
Note: Group differences in estimated means for the group by stimuli by evidence type interaction. The bar graph shows the estimated 
marginal means of the three-way interaction between group, stimuli, and evidence type for the unlikely building in the affective Mixed 
Sequence determined with a linear mixed model. Bars indicate standard error. Estimate deviation from Bayes inference was calculated by 
subtracting the participant’s probability estimate from Bayes calculation. For the unlikely source, estimate deviation with a higher value 
indicates a more conservative approach to probabilistic reasoning relative to Bayes inference. Contrast interaction comparing confirmatory 
spies and an average of confirmatory civilians, disconfirmatory spies, and disconfirmatory civilians between the groups showed that SZ 
were significantly closer to Bayes inference and less conservative than HC for all combinations of stimuli and evidence type except for 
confirmatory spies. The scatterplots on the right show the Pearson and Spearman’s rank order correlations between SAPS Delusions and 
estimate deviation for confirmatory spies (gray bar labeled A; top scatterplot) and estimate deviation for the average of the three gray bars 
labeled B (confirmatory civilians, disconfirmatory spies, and disconfirmatory civilians).   
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Figure 4.4 
 
Note: Pearson and Spearman’s rank order correlations between probabilistic reasoning and delusional thinking in people with 
schizophrenia. SAPS Delusions = Delusions subscale of the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. Estimate deviation from 
Bayes inference was calculated by subtracting the participant’s probability estimate from Bayes calculation. For the likely source, estimate 
deviation with a lower value indicates a more conservative approach to probabilistic reasoning relative to Bayes inference. For the unlikely 
source, estimate deviation with a higher value indicates a more conservative approach to probabilistic reasoning relative to Bayes 
inference. Significant Pearson and Spearman’s rank order correlations between SAPS Delusions and the estimate deviation for the likely 
and unlikely jars and then likely and unlikely buildings for participants with schizophrenia are provided in Parts A, B, C, and D, respectively. 
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Supplemental Figure 4.1 
 
Note: Example of the neutral version of the graded estimates task. 
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Supplemental Figure 4.2 
 
Note: Example of the affective version of the graded estimates task.
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Supplemental Figure 4.3 
 
 
Note: Illustration of the intercept group difference in estimate deviation for the two-way interaction between neurocognition and 
evidence type. Specifically, linear mixed model two-way interaction between evidence type (confirmatory or disconfirmatory) and 
neurocognition (BACS z-score) plotted for SZ and HC estimate deviations to show the intercept difference between the groups. HC = 
healthy control. SZ = schizophrenia. BACS = Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This dissertation aimed to further our understanding of cognitive and affective 
processes linked to distress and poor functional outcomes in schizophrenia. The use of 
self-report measures and behavioral tasks allowed us to examine the relationship 
between: 1) emotional experience and social functioning in psychotic and affective 
disorders, 2) paranoia and sound localization in schizophrenia, and 3) delusions and 
affective probabilistic reasoning in schizophrenia. The methods and findings of each 
study are summarized below.   
Study 1 
 Participant data was aggregated from multiple studies (N = 1,118) with similar 
self-report measures of emotional experience and social functioning to determine the 
relationship these two constructs while accounting for “traditional” predictors of 
functioning that include general cognition or intelligence, social cognition, positive and 
negative symptoms, and mania. Measures of negative and positive affect included the 
Beck Depression Inventory, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Psychological Stress Index, 
Differential Emotions Scale, Positive and Negative Affect Scale, and Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire. Social functioning was assessed with the Social Adjustment 
Scale – Self Report). Neurocognition was assessed with the Brief Assessment of
 Cognition in Schizophrenia. Social cognition (Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test), positive symptoms (Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms), 
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negative symptoms (Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms), and mania 
(Young Mania Rating Scale) were used. Hierarchical linear regression was used to 
determine if measures of emotional experience predicted a significant amount of 
variance in social functioning above and beyond “traditional” predictors of functioning.   
Study 2 
 Participants with schizophrenia (n = 20) and matched controls with no history of 
mental illness (n = 22) localized 48 auditory stimuli from the International Affective 
Digitized Sounds database. The sound localization paradigm consisted of a 360-degree 
horizontal plane with eight active speakers. The Green at al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale 
was used to determine level of paranoia, and neurocognition was assessed with the 
Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. Participants rated the valence and 
arousal elicited for each sound. Absolute error was calculated in order to obtain an 
accurate reflection of sound localization performance (i.e., negative values could 
artificially reduce the amount of total error). A gamma distribution was observed due to 
relatively strong performance of participants (resulting in a high concentration of 
accurate performances and a right skew for localization error) and a generalized linear 
model was used to appropriately examine if sound localization performance was related 
to individual or standardized ratings of valence and arousal. Pearson and Spearman’s 
rank order correlations were used to determine the relationship between paranoia and 
mean absolute error, along with partial correlation between paranoia and mean absolute 
error while accounting for neurocognition.    
Study 3 
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 Participants with schizophrenia (n = 27) and matched controls with no history of 
mental illness (n = 24) completed a neutral and affective version of a probabilistic 
reasoning task. Participants provided probability estimates of how likely a sequences of 
color beads or affective stimuli (i.e., threatening spies or non-threatening civilians) was 
coming from a likely and unlikely source. Each sequence included ten pieces of 
evidence comprised of all confirmatory evidence or a mix of confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory evidence. Probability estimates were compared against Bayes inference 
for all analyses, resulting in an estimate deviation score for the likely and unlikely source 
according to evidence type (confirmatory or disconfirmatory) and stimuli type 
(threatening or non-threatening) for the affective version only. Analysis of covariance 
and linear mixed models were used to determine group differences in estimate 
deviation, along with additional main effects of evidence or stimuli type and any possible 
interactions between main effects. Delusional severity in SZ was assessed with the 
delusions subscale of the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. The 
relationship between delusions and estimate deviation was determined with Pearson 
and Spearman’s rank order correlations. 
Taken together, this dissertation research showed that heightened negative- and 
reduced positive emotional experience is related to social functioning impairment in 
psychotic disorders, affective disorders, psychiatrically healthy individuals, and an 
online crowdsourcing sample representative of the general population above and 
beyond “traditional” predictors of functioning in serious mental illnesses that include 
general cognition or intelligence, social cognition, positive or negative symptoms, and 
mania. These findings suggest that emotional experience is associated with social 
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functioning along a continuum of psychiatrically healthy individuals to people with a 
serious mental illness. This is consistent with previous research that suggests a 
relationship between heightened negative affect, reduced positive affect, and social 
functioning in schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression (Havermans, 
Nicolson, Berkhof, & deVries, 2010; Hofmann & Meyer, 2006; Kring & Moran, 2008; 
Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Oorschot et al., 2013). In addition, people with 
schizophrenia had difficulty localizing natural sounds that occur in the environment (e.g., 
someone yelling) compared with those with no history of mental illness, similar to 
previous reports of localization impairment of laboratory stimuli (e.g., clicks or tones) in 
people with schizophrenia (Balogh, Schuck, & Leventhal, 1979; Perrin et al., 2010). For 
those with schizophrenia, this impairment was related to reduced levels of paranoia. 
Sound localization was also influenced by standardized but not individual ratings of 
valence and arousal among all participants, with the influence of arousal on sound 
localization deficits increasing with more unpleasant sounds. Thus, sound localization 
deficits are characteristic of schizophrenia, yet within schizophrenia heightened levels of 
paranoia associated with improved sound localization even when accounting for 
neurocognition. Finally, probabilistic reasoning of confirmatory and disconfirmatory 
evidence coming from a likely and unlikely source during neural and affective contexts 
is closer to Bayes inference for people with schizophrenia compared with those without 
a history of mental illness. That is, healthy individuals demonstrated of conservative 
pattern of probabilistic reasoning by underestimating likely events and overestimating 
unlikely events relative to people with schizophrenia and also Bayes inference. 
However, within the affective context, healthy individuals demonstrated probabilistic 
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reasoning similar to people with schizophrenia for threatening confirmatory evidence 
only. In addition, less conservative probability estimates were related to more severe 
delusional thinking in people with schizophrenia within the affective context only. While 
the finding of less conservative probabilistic reasoning in people with schizophrenia 
compared with healthy individuals is consistent with previous reports (Garety, Hemsley, 
& Wessely, 1991; Langdon, Ward, & Coltheart, 2010; Speechley, 2010), the current 
findings suggest that probabilistic reasoning is influenced by affective contexts and that 
a less conservative pattern of probabilistic reasoning could play a role in delusional 
thinking in people with schizophrenia. 
The findings of this dissertation may help to inform the cognitive model that is the 
basis for cognitive-behavioral therapy for psychosis (CBTp). According to this model, a 
cycle of biased processing of events/stimuli contribute to distorted interpretations of 
these experiences and the development of maladaptive emotional and behavioral 
responses (Beck, 1963, 2005). Despite evidence for the improved outcomes post CBTp 
treatment (Kane et al., 2016), a better understanding of this model could lead to 
increased effectiveness. The observed relationship between social functioning deficits 
and heightened negative emotions, and also reduced positive emotions, in Study 1 
lends support for a strong association between maladaptive emotions and behaviors. In 
addition, the transdiagnostic approach used in Study 1 suggests that a unified treatment 
protocol targeting emotional experience may be appropriate for psychotic and affective 
disorders. While the causal relationship is unknown, it is possible that mundane social 
interactions are experienced as stressful events that elicit heightened negative affect 
(Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). The observed deficits in sound localization in people with 
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schizophrenia compared with healthy individuals in Study 2 suggests that people with 
schizophrenia there may be susceptible to misinterpreting the environment, which could 
contribute to biased processing of events/stimuli and the development of maladaptive 
emotions and behaviors purported to arise in the CBTp model. Yet, the relationship 
between heightened paranoia (which could also promote biased interpretations of 
events/stimuli), and improved sound localization in people with schizophrenia indicates 
attentional and sensory resources may be allocated to help compensate for localization 
deficits. However, further research is needed to elucidate the relationship between 
paranoia and sound localization, along with the functional impact of sound localization 
deficits in schizophrenia. The observed probabilistic reasoning style of overestimating 
likely events and underestimating unlikely events in people with schizophrenia relative 
to healthy individuals in Study 3 suggests that while people with schizophrenia may 
estimate probability more accurately, this may not be adaptive, as the relationship 
between increased delusional severity and a less conservative pattern of probabilistic 
reasoning in SZ (relative to HC) was observed. Incorporating the findings of this 
dissertation with the example used in the Introduction, the sound of a neighbor walking 
through your yard late at night may be hastily misinterpreted (sound localization deficits 
reported in Study 2 may contribute to this misinterpretation and the neighbor could be 
walking through a different yard) as a suspicious act due to overestimation of what is 
considered a likely event and underestimation of unlikely event (person is not acting 
suspicious), which was reported in Study 3. This perceived threat might lead to the 
evocation of negative affect that helps to reinforce the belief (e.g., “I feel fear and 
anxiety so this person is a threat”) and behavioral changes such as avoiding neighbors. 
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Heightened negative affect (reported in Study 1) and repeated avoidance could result in 
missed opportunities to challenge this hasty conclusion, and along with a less 
conservative style of probabilistic reasoning relative healthy individuals, could lead to a 
false belief or delusion.  
To conclude, the results of this dissertation helped to inform cognitive models of 
psychotic symptoms. By examining emotional experience and social functioning, 
paranoia and the interpretation of the environment, and affective probabilistic reasoning 
and delusions in people with schizophrenia, the current findings may help to enhance 
our understanding of critical psychosocial treatment targets and provide directions for 
future research and treatment development. 
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